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Abstract
In this paper, we use an experimental approach to investigate the well-known
tension between equality in society and individual freedom of choice. We have con-
ducted a large-scale international experiment with nationally representative samples
from Norway and the United States to create a situation that forces the participants
to make a choice between respecting two other people’s preferences or implement
equality. We find that in Norway, 74.8 % of the participants put more weight on
equality rather than respecting people’s preferences, and they thereby choose equal-
ity at the expense of individual freedom. The corresponding number in the United
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1 Introduction
All over the world, a central question is how society should make the trade-off between
respecting individual freedom and securing equality. The ideal of equality among citizens
is a highly regarded ideal in many societies, while at the same time, the ideal of individual
freedom and people’s right to make their own choices without government intervention is
also seen as a central part of a democratic society. However, with freedom of choice comes
the freedom to take risk, and this may lead to unequal outcomes among citizens. Hence,
the ideal of individual freedom is in conflict with the ideal of equality, and the tension
between these two ideals and how people weigh them makes for an interesting discussion.
As a society, we need to decide to what extent we want to allow people to freely make
choices involving risk that potentially leads to undesirable outcomes.
In economics, individual preferences are given a strong position when deciding how the
economy should be organized. For instance, in standard economic theory the concept of
consumer sovereignty builds on the argument that the market economy is set up to best
serve the interest of the individual consumer. As production will follow from the demand
of the consumers, what products are produced will be decided by the consumers, based on
the idea that they themselves know best what products will maximize their utility, not the
government or the producers. Additionally, it is commonly accepted that interfering in a
free market will result in a loss of efficiency. This is due to the fact that some consensual
interactions benefiting both consumers and producers will no longer take place, meaning
that both parties would have been better off without the intervention.
In general, a reasonable principle for individual freedom seems to be that the main opinions
to be respected when evaluating different prospects are the interests of the affected parties.
That is, if for two prospects A and B, all parties affected prefer prospect A to prospect
B, it seems reasonable that the society as a whole should prefer prospect A to prospect
B.
However, there are some situations where it seems necessary to intervene and reduce
people’s freedom of choice. We distinguish between two kinds of paternalism; classic
paternalism and moral paternalism. Classic paternalism is related to cases where there
is reason to believe that people do not make decisions that promote their own good. For
instance, people often fail to save sufficiently for their pension. Saving too little seems to
come with greater costs than saving too much, and still there is substantial evidence that
people fail to enroll in pension plans and save enough. This is shown to hold true even
for very attractive pension plans (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In this kind of cases, it
seems reasonable that the government should act paternalistically and intervene to help
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people promote their own good. However, we do not study classic paternalism through
our experiment, but rather moral paternalism. In moral paternalism, the justification
for the paternalistic intervention is to promote an ideal the paternalist considers to be
morally superior. Rather than helping people make a better choice for themselves, the
paternalist wants to implement what he considers morally right. In our design, the person
who gets the possibility to act paternalistically has no reason to believe that the persons
they are intervening for do not know their own good. The only reason to intervene is
if they put their moral ideal higher than both efficiency and the freedom of choice of
the affected parties. One moral ideal that seems particularly important in distributive
choices is fairness. People especially seem to dislike inequality that arises due to luck,
while they are more willing to accept inequality that arises from differences in performance
(Almås et al., 2016). People show an aversion towards inequality even when they are the
ones benefiting from the inequality. This aversion has for example been shown in lab
experiments with dictator games (List, 2007), (Forsythe et al., 1994).
In most situations involving economic policy, there exist a trade-off between equity and
efficiency. This is a result of the fact that ensuring equity involves some sort of redistri-
bution between high income groups and low income groups. As redistribution inevitably
comes with a cost, this will lead to a less efficient outcome. For example, using an income
tax to redistribute income will distort the market equilibrium as the incentives to work
will be affected. In our design, we have one set of treatments revealing the trade-off be-
tween equity and efficiency, while we have another set of treatments primarily looking at
how individual freedom is weighed compared to equality.
The considerations involved in the trade-off between freedom of choice and equality are
essential both for policy makers and private individuals. However, welfare economics has
still not agreed on how to evaluate such decisions between risky social prospects. In
this thesis, we use an experimental approach to analyze how people actually make such
choices.
Our experimental design combines the infrastructure of an international online market-
place and two leading international data collection agencies. The experiment has two
groups of people; workers and spectators. The spectators make a real distributive choice
for two workers who have both completed the same task. The spectators can choose
between two different payment schemes, (I) an egalitarian payment scheme where both
workers receive a medium payment, and (II) a non-egalitarian payment scheme where one
of the workers receives a high payment and the other a low payment. We focus on the
choices of spectators in a situation where both workers have chosen the non-egalitarian
payment scheme, and the spectators have to decide to either respect the workers’ freedom
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of choice and let the payments be decided by the random draw, or to implement equal
payments. This ensures a situation where there is a tension between respecting the work-
ers’ freedom of choice and implementing equality. If the spectators choose the egalitarian
payment scheme, they show that they choose in accordance with their moral preferences
for equality and ignores the workers’ freedom of choice. By implementing the egalitarian
payment scheme, the spectators reduce the expected payoff for all workers slightly. They
do not allow the workers to take the risk involved in the non-egalitarian payment scheme,
but they significantly improve the outcome of the workers that would have been worst off
in the non-egalitarian payment scheme. This sheds light on how people make the trade-off
between freedom of choice and equality. The experiment was conducted with nationally
representative samples of spectators from Norway and the United States, which allows us
to identify differences in preferences between the two countries.
Inspired by Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve (2013), we can illustrate how this kind of choice
between risky prospects exists in everyday life. In Norway, all women born in 1991 or
later were from the 1st of November 2016 until the 1st of November 2018 offered to take
the HPV vaccine for free. This program involves a cost for all participating women, in the
form of having to take the vaccine three times, but it also involves substantial gains for
some women as it prevents cancer at a later stage in life. Thus, the government’s choice of
implementing this program involves reducing the expected outcome of all women slightly,
but significantly improving the outcome of the ones who would have been worst off.
This mirrors the outcome of the egalitarian payment scheme, where the total payoff is
slightly smaller, but the worst off people are better off than the worst off people in the
non-egalitarian payment scheme.
There are also other choices in everyday life situations that involves choosing between
risky prospects, but that in character are very different from the one described above.
For example, some people might prefer to have a performance based wage, and some
employers might prefer this kind of wage scheme. Thus, both the affected parties prefer
this payment scheme. These wage schemes lead the final salary to be very uncertain.
However, workers in some fields can choose between jobs with a certain medium wage
or jobs with a low certain wage and large bonus opportunities. The latter will result
in "winners" and "losers" and thus inequality. Whether we as society want to move in
the direction of mainly performance based wages, creating more inequality, is a debated
question. Another example of choices involving risk, is occupations involving hazards.
Some jobs which involve significant risk will offer high salaries, in effect paying a risk
premium to their workers. This means that while the majority will be slightly better off
by receiving a higher salary for having a job involving risk, some workers will get injured
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and be significantly worse off than they would have been had they not taken the risk. This
makes choosing between a safe occupation and a hazardous occupation a choice involving
different outcomes with different probabilities.
How different societies handle the trade-off between individual freedom and equality vary
across the world. This can be due to a number of factors. The institutions of a country and
how much the citizens trust these institutions is likely to affect the degree of acceptance
of government interventions. Another factor could be cultural differences, resulting in
different views on the government’s role in society. It is common to think of the United
States as a society where respecting individual preferences is important, and where people
place a high value on the individual freedom of both themselves and others. Norway
along with the other Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, is often considered to be
a society that is more accepting of government regulations and where a focus on equality
often overshadows the respect for individual freedom of choice.
We find that a majority of the spectators choose to implement equality among two work-
ers who had completed the same task, even though they knew that both of the workers
preferred to have their payment decided through a payment scheme involving unequal out-
comes. That is, the spectators choose to not respect the freedom of choice of the workers
and rather ensure that they receive equal payments. We also find that being asked to make
the distributive choice after the inequality between the workers has arisen significantly
increases the share of spectators implementing the egalitarian payment scheme. Further-
more, we find that Norwegians are significantly more willing than Americans to implement
the egalitarian payment scheme, both before and after the inequality has arisen. Addi-
tionally, we find that knowing that the workers themselves prefer to have their payment
decided by the non-egalitarian payment scheme significantly reduces the willingness to
implement the egalitarian payment scheme.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows; section 2 presents an overview of the
relevant literature, section 3 describes the data collection and the experimental design,
section 4 presents the empirical strategy, section 5 presents the main results, and section
6 concludes.
2 Background
The main part of the literature review is subsection 2.1, where we go through the relevant
literature regarding the conflicting principles for evaluating social choice under uncer-
tainty. For the remainder of the section we go through the literature on paternalism in
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subsection 2.2, then the well-known trade-off between equity and efficiency in 2.3, and
finally subsection 2.4 provides an overview of the research on different attitudes towards
inequality between Norway and the United States.
2.1 Ex Ante Pareto, Ex Post Egalitarianism, and Dominance
In general, there are three intuitive principles that should be considered when comparing
distributive choices involving risk. The three principles are conflicting, as it is not possible
to obey all three of them at the same time. One must be rejected. This conflict is at the
heart of Harsanyi’s (1955) utilitarian theorem. The three principles are as follows (based
on Nissan-Rozen (2017)):
1. Ex ante Pareto: If, for all individuals, the expected utility of one prospect, A, is higher
than the expected utility of another prospect, B, then A is preferred to B.
2. Ex post egalitarianism: There are some cases where a more egalitarian distribution,
A, is preferred to another less egalitarian distribution, B. This is true even if the total
amount of utility is larger in distribution B than in distribution A.
3. Dominance: If the outcomes of one prospect, A, are better than the outcomes of
another prospect, B, in every state of the world, then A is preferred to B.
Ex ante is Latin for "before the event" as opposed to ex post meaning "after the event".
Ex ante is commonly used when considering outcomes that are yet to happen, while ex
post is used when considering outcomes in retrospect.
To get a clearer sense of the meaning of the three principles, consider the situation de-
scribed in Table 1.




The table shows the payoff of two individuals, individual 1 and individual 2, from now
referred to as workers, in the case of two different prospects, A and B, and two different
states of the world, w1 and w2. The payoff represents the utility the workers receive.
The final outcome is determined partly by chance, as each state of the world has a 50 %
probability of occurring, and partly by an external third party, hereby called a spectator,
choosing between prospects A and B.
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Let us suppose the spectator is an ex post egalitarian and prefers certain equal outcomes
to unequal outcomes. That is, the spectator prefers the equal outcome (2,2) to either
of the unequal outcomes (5,1) and (1,5), even though the total payoff is higher in the
unequal outcomes. This implies that prospect A is preferred to prospect B in both states
of the world, w1 and w2. The principle of dominance therefore yields that prospect A
must be better than prospect B.
However, for both worker 1 and 2, their expected payoff is 2 for prospect A and 3 for
prospect B. As all workers receive a higher expected payoff from B than from A, prospect
B is preferred to prospect A according to the ex ante Pareto principle.
This situation shows the impossibility in evaluating distributive choices involving risk. A
question that naturally arises is then, when one has to reject one of the principles, which
one should be rejected?
In a comment to Harsanyi’s article (1955), Diamond (1967) presents an argument for
rejecting the dominance principle1. Diamond presents an example demonstrating the
possible problems that may result from obeying the dominance principle. Table 2 shows
the hypothetical situation described by Diamond (notation has been altered to be consis-
tent with the notation in Table 1).




As in the previous example, an external third party is making a choice between two
prospects, A and B. The payoffs of the two individuals concerned, worker 1 and worker
2, are determined as in the previous example.
In this example, choosing prospect A will result in the outcome (1,0) with certainty, as
this is the payoff regardless of which state of the world occurs. By choosing prospect
B however, the result is still that one worker receives a payoff of 1, while the other one
receives a payoff of 0. However, who of the workers that ends up being on which side of the
income distribution is determined by chance, and each of them has an equal probability
of receiving a payoff of either 1 or 0.
1Nissan-Rozen (2017) presents a different argument for rejecting the principle of dominance. A thor-
ough description of this argument can be found in section 8.3 in the appendix.
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The dominance principle yields that if the outcomes of one prospect are preferred to
the outcomes of another prospect in all states of the world ex ante, then this prospect
should also be preferred ex post. In this situation, all of the four outcomes in Table 2
are considered equally good ex post, as the same degree of inequality arises regardless of
choice of prospect or state of the world. One worker will get a payoff of 1 while the other
will get a payoff of 0, and we assume that the spectator treats the workers symmetrically
and is indifferent between who of the workers is better off.
Ex ante however, the consideration becomes different. The spectator does not know which
of the two states will occur, only the probability of each of them. In terms of expected
payoff, the choice of the spectator becomes choosing between prospect A with the expected
payoff distribution (1,0) and prospect B with the expected payoff distribution (0.5, 0.5).
The expected payoffs show the difference between the prospects. While A for sure yields
an unequal distribution of payoff in worker 1’s favor, B gives each of the workers a fair
chance at being the one better off. Diamond’s point is that for an egalitarian, prospect B
seems strictly preferable ex ante, because the possibility of outcomes, not only the final
payoffs, is of importance. As the spectator is indifferent between A and B ex post, strictly
preferring prospect B to A ex ante involves rejecting the dominance principle.
On the other hand, Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve (2013) argue that it is rather the ex ante
Pareto principle that should be rejected. They present a principle of rationality, called
the principle of full information, that they argue should be respected in the evaluation
of the different prospects. We continue to use the example from Table 1. The argument
goes as follows. Let us assume that the spectator is an ex post egalitarian and therefore
prefers certain equal outcomes to unequal outcomes. Evaluating prospects ex ante, the
spectator can justify choosing prospect B on the grounds that it was in the best interest
of both worker 1 and 2 given the information she had at the time.
Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve further imagine each of the workers having a guardian seeking
to provide the best possible outcome for the worker they are guarding. The spectator
should only be choosing prospects that are the preferred prospect of both the guardian
of worker 1 and the guardian of worker 2. Ex ante, both guardians would approve of the
spectator’s choice of prospect B, given that they have the same information she has. If
the spectator would have an opportunity to acquire full information without any costs,
she must do it, as if she does not, she can no longer claim that she is acting in the best
interest of both workers, and that their guardians would have acted in the same way.
Let us assume that the guardians are fully informed, and that the spectator has the
opportunity to get advice from both guardians. That is, they have full information in
the sense that they know which state of the world will occur, w1 or w2. The spectator
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should act in accordance with what the fully informed guardians would advice her to, as
this would preserve the best interest of both worker 1 and 2. When considering prospect
B, the guardians both know which state will occur and hence, the guardian of the worker
who will get a payoff of 5 in the state that will occur will advice the spectator to choose
prospect B, while the guardian of the other worker, who will get a payoff of 1, will advice
against choosing this prospect.
Hence, the spectator knows that choosing prospect B is unjustifiable regardless of which
state of the world would occur. Either worker 1 would be worst off and his guardian would
advice against choosing prospect B, or worker 2 would be worst off and his guardian would
advice against it. Since the spectator is an egalitarian treating the workers symmetrically,
both of these outcomes make choosing prospect B equally unjustifiable. Therefore, if the
spectator could consult both workers’ fully informed guardians, she could not justify
choosing prospect B and hence, she should always prefer the egalitarian prospect A.
Consulting the workers’ guardians would be equivalent to having full information. It
seems reasonable for the spectator to prefer making decisions with full information to
making decisions without full information. The spectator in this case knows that she
would strictly prefer prospect A to prospect B if she had full information, regardless of
what that information would be. Therefore, it is rational for the spectator to choose
prospect A, as this is to act as if she had full information. This is coined by Fleurbaey
and Voorhoeve as the principle of full information.
Following this, the spectator, being an egalitarian, would choose prospect A ex post, and,
as explained above, also choose prospect A ex ante. Thus, the spectator is fulfilling ex
post egalitarianism and the dominance principle, but rejecting the principle of ex ante
Pareto.
Through the analysis of the experimental data, we shed light on whether the majority of
the egalitarian participants reject the ex ante Pareto principle or the dominance principle
when they are put in a situation that forces them to inevitably reject one of them.
2.2 Paternalism
A central question in politics, but also in personal relationships, is if, when, and to what
extent someone has the right to intervene in someone else’s life. When someone intervenes
in someone else’s life without their consent, this is often referred to as paternalism. Pa-
ternalism is defined as "the interference of a state or an individual with another person,
against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with
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will be better off or protected from harm" (Dworkin, 2017).
There are several different types of paternalism. It is common to distinguish between hard
and soft paternalism, hard and soft describing how strongly one intervenes in someone
else’s life. Soft paternalism for example involves forcing information on someone, so that
they will not make a decision lacking knowledge regarding the potential consequences.
Hard paternalism on the other hand could find it justifiable to prevent an action even if the
persons involved have information regarding the potential outcomes. Another distinction,
especially relevant for our case, is the distinction between moral paternalism and welfare
paternalism. Welfare paternalism is the classic type of paternalism where the justification
for interfering in another person’s life is that it promotes the welfare of this person. Moral
paternalism however, seeks to promote the moral welfare of this person (Dworkin, 2017).
That is, the intervention is not justified as promoting the interests of the person, but
rather promoting a moral ideal. Paternalism has received a lot of attention in recent
years, culminating in the Nobel Prize in Economics being awarded to the economist
Richard Thaler for "his contribution to behavioral economics", among which his work on
nudging has been influential (Nobel Foundation, 2017). This field of research lies within
what is commonly defined as soft paternalism.
In our analysis, we study how people constrain other people’s freedom in order to promote
an ideal that they consider to be morally superior. As our design is not aimed at tricking
the workers into choosing a payment scheme that does not best promote their own good,
it is not clear that the spectators are acting as welfare paternalists when not respecting
the workers’ individual preferences. In our design, there is no reason to believe that the
spectator sees her choice as a choice between giving the worker the freedom to make a
decision that does not best promote their own good, or acting paternalistically and help
the worker make a better decision. It is not clear from an objective point of view that one
of the payment schemes is better for the worker, it is only a matter of what the spectator
considers morally superior. Thus, they are not paternalists in the classic sense, but rather
moral paternalists.
Our hypothesis is that spectators violate the ex ante Pareto principle and implement the
egalitarian payment scheme at the expense of individual freedom, as previous research




In welfare economics, both equity and efficiency are important ideals. It is commonly
asserted that there is a trade-off between these two objectives, as increasing the focus on
one of them results in reducing the focus on the other one. That is, securing equal out-
comes comes at the expense of efficiency. Okun (1975) provides a hypothetical experiment
demonstrating the salience of this trade-off in redistributive policies. Okun describes a
situation in which there are inequalities and a redistributive policy is introduced involv-
ing taxing the individuals in the upper part of the income distribution and distribute the
money to the individuals in the lower part of the distribution. However, in this redis-
tributive process, the money are transported in a leaking bucket, resulting in part of the
money disappearing during transportation. Hence, the amount that is distributed to the
low income individuals is lower than the amount taken from the high income individuals.
The leaking bucket is an analogy for the inefficiencies inevitably involved in redistributive
policy. Hence, being an egalitarian involves being willing to reduce the total payoff of the
individuals concerned in order to improve the payoff of the individuals worst off.
In our experiment, we mainly investigate how people act when confronted with a situa-
tion where they must choose whether to respect individual freedom or to ensure equality.
However, we also include a treatment where the participants must choose between imple-
menting equality or efficiency.
2.4 Norway versus the United States
One important aspect of our analysis is the difference between Americans and Norwegians.
There is a large literature on international differences in attitudes towards inequality and
redistribution, which is closely related to preferences in distributive choices. This litera-
ture consists of both large, non-incentivized representative surveys like the World Value
Survey, the European Social Survey, the General Social Survey and the International So-
cial Survey Programme, and of incentivized lab-experiments on non-representative sam-
ples (Barrett et al. (2016), Grimalda et al. (2016), Henrich et al. (2005), and Henrich
et al. (2010)). Almås et al. (2016) uses an empirical approach that "(...) combines the
strengths of the survey approach (large representative samples) and the lab experimental
approach (incentivized choices)" in their study of social preferences in Norway and the
United States.
There are several research papers looking at the differences in social preferences between
the Scandinavian countries and the United States. The income inequality in the United
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States is much larger than in the other OECD countries, and Americans are systemati-
cally more willing to accept inequality than Norwegians (Almås et al., 2016). Individual
freedom is of great importance in the United States, while the Scandinavian countries are
well-known for being socialist countries with a generous welfare state.
Following our hypothesis that the majority of spectators will implement the egalitarian
payment scheme at the expense of individual freedom, we believe that the share imple-
menting the egalitarian payment scheme will be greater in Norway than in the United
States.
3 Design
To collect data, we recruited two types of participants: workers from an online interna-
tional labor market and spectators from two leading international data collection agencies.
The workers first worked on a real-effort task, before they were matched with another
worker and asked to choose between two payment schemes. However, they were told that
the payment for the task with a certain probability was going to be determined by a
third party. After all workers had completed the task and chosen their preferred payment
scheme, we recruited the persons who were going to be the aforementioned third party,
i.e. the spectators. The spectators were randomly assigned to different treatments, be-
fore they were matched with a pair of workers and asked to choose which of the payment
schemes that was to be implemented. The spectators’ choice of preferred payment scheme
are used in the analysis, while the workers’ choice of preferred payment scheme were given
as information to the spectators in some of the treatments.
The design enables us to create an experimental setting where the participants make real-
world decisions in an incentive compatible environment. Traditionally, survey respondents
have answered hypothetical questions, which means that their behavior may differ from
how they would have acted had their actions had real world consequences. As an experi-
mental design introduces such consequences, it reveals the respondents’ true preferences
to a greater extent than traditional surveys do.
The experimental design also enables us to compare the answers of the Norwegian and
the American spectators and infer how they differ in their preferences. By using an ex-
perimental setting, we ensure that the spectators make the distributive choice in identical
situations. If we did not use an experimental design, we would not know whether a
difference in the answers from the Norwegian and American spectators was due to, for
example, different costs of redistribution in Norway and the US, or truly due to Americans
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and Norwegians having different redistributive preferences. By placing the spectators in
identical situations, we are able to isolate differences in the spectators’ answers to only
stem from differences in their preferences and nothing else.
3.1 Workers
The workers were recruited through the international online marketplace Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (mTurk). mTurk is a crowdsourcing Internet marketplace where people
and businesses, called requesters, can post tasks that can only be done by a human and
not a computer. These tasks are called Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs), and workers on
mTurk can browse and choose between thousands of HITs. The requesters set the amount
they want to pay for their HITs and the number of workers they want to complete the
HIT, and the workers get paid accordingly after having completed the HIT. It is also
possible to pay the workers a bonus in addition to the fixed payment, for instance to
reward certain workers.
We recruited 5140 workers for the Norwegian spectator sample, and 5260 workers for the
American spectator sample. In both groups some workers submitted the HIT without
having answered the survey, leaving us with respectively 5119 and 5231 workers.
The workers on mTurk who accepted the HIT first completed a task consisting of answer-
ing a short survey. They were then matched with another worker who had completed the
same task and asked to choose between two different payment schemes. The only infor-
mation they got about the other worker was that he or she had completed the same task.
The payment schemes they could choose between were (I) an egalitarian payment scheme
where both workers got paid 2 USD and (II) a non-egalitarian payment scheme where one
of the workers got paid 5 USD while the other got paid 1 USD, and who received the high
and low payment was decided by a random draw. All workers also got a participation
fee of 1 USD regardless of choice of payment scheme. They were told that with a given
probability, their choice of payment scheme would be implemented. Otherwise, it would
be decided by a third party. The probability of getting their own choice implemented was
10%, independently of their preferred payment scheme.
The beauty of the design is that the way the workers choose the payment scheme is incen-
tive compatible, as they can achieve the best outcome for themselves just by choosing in
accordance with their true preferences. Because the workers’ choice with a given probabil-
ity will be implemented, they have an incentive to choose their preferred option. Contrary
to traditional surveys where participants make decisions with hypothetical consequences,
the design allows the spectators to make a decision with real world consequences for two
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other people.
Cameron (1999) finds that the results from ultimatum games with hypothetical payoffs
differ significantly from the games with real stakes. Hence, people do not necessarily reveal
their true preferences in hypothetical choices. This might be due to people intentionally
choosing differently than they would have done in a situation with real consequences,
for instance to come across as more generous, more altruistic and nicer than they truly
are. However, it might as well be due to people not knowing their true preferences, and
thus unintentionally choosing differently than they would have done if their decisions
had real world consequences. In our design, some workers might for instance believe
that they are less risk averse than they are revealed to be when choosing between risky
prospects with real world consequences. Another possibility is that participants are more
susceptible to the experimenter demand effect when consequences are only hypothetical.
The experimenter demand effect is when participants in experiments adapt their behavior
to what they believe the experimenter wants, either consciously or unconsciously.
3.2 Spectators
We had two groups of spectators. The first group consisted of 2000 Norwegian spectators
recruited through the data collection agency Norstat. The second group consisted of 2005
American spectators recruited through the data collection agency Research Now. The
sample from the United States includes 5 extra spectators as the survey was not closed
in time. However, these spectators were also matched with workers from mTurk and
their choices had real world consequences. The spectators in both groups were nation-
ally representative (18+ years old) on three observable characteristics: gender, age and
geography.
There are several reasons why we chose to use data collection agencies to recruit the
spectators. By recruiting spectators through data collection agencies, we obtained a
sample of the general population. This is beneficial, as having nationally representative
samples makes it more likely that the results are generalizable to the population as a
whole. Many lab-experiments are conducted with students, which is likely to limit the
external validity to the student population they are drawn from. As seen in Cappelen et al.
(2015), the preferences of students may not be generalizable to the society at large. They
find that "the representative participants differ fundamentally from students both in their
level of selfishness and in the relative importance assigned to different moral motives".
Hence, using a nationally representative sample is crucial for the external validity of our
results, as we want the results to be generalizable to the broader population. Nationally
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representative samples also make it possible to compare the spectators’ choices across
different countries, which we take advantage of in our analysis. Using data collection
agencies also makes it easier to get large samples, increasing the statistical power of the
analysis.
Using nationally representative samples is important for the external validity of the results,
as we want the results to be generalizable to the population as a whole. The populations
of interest in our case are the populations of the United States and Norway. Because
we cannot run the experiment on all people in the United States and Norway, we use a
subsample of the populations in the experiment. As these subsamples are random samples
of the populations of interest, we can infer characteristics about the general population
from the results of the experiment.
However, there is a risk that there is a selection bias even when using nationally repre-
sentative samples. The samples are nationally representative on three observable charac-
teristics, but apart from this we know little about the respondents. It would have been
possible to use more observable characteristics when recruiting the sample, but there is
a large number of important characteristics that are unobserved and thus impossible to
use in the recruitment process. If, for instance, people who answer surveys are more
egalitarian than the population as a whole, the answers would be more egalitarian than if
the whole population were asked, and this would give biased results. It is however close
to impossible to be certain that a sample is truly nationally representative on both ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics. This would require randomly drawing a large
sample from the population, with mandatory participation ensuring a 100% compliance
rate. However, as we have a large sample size that is nationally representative on three
observable characteristics, our sample is likely to resemble the actual population to a large
extent.
The spectators were divided into four different treatments, and each spectator was matched
with a pair of workers and asked to make a distributive choice for these workers. The de-
gree of information given to the spectators about the workers differed across treatments.
However, all spectators were told that two workers had completed a task on an inter-
national online marketplace, that both workers had been paid 1 USD for participating
and that it was now up to the spectator to decide between payment scheme (I) and (II),
described in section 3.1. All spectators were also told that their choice was going to be
implemented and thus have consequences for a real situation.
Because we did not want the spectators to think of the distributive choice as a mathemati-
cal task, we did not tell them what share of the workers was matched with a spectator and
what share got their own choice implemented. We wanted them to consider the choice to
14
be a distributive choice where they were to implement the payment scheme they thought
was right given the situation, not to try to calculate a "correct" answer. To make the
information given to the workers and the spectators as equal as possible, the workers
were only told that with a given probability, their choice of payment scheme would be
implemented.
A spectator design has several advantages, but the most important for our analysis is that
it enables us to cleanly identify the spectators’ moral views. If the payment of the person
who makes the distributive choice is affected by what he or she chooses, the choice will be
affected by both self-interest and his or her moral views. When people make distributive
choices involving themselves and others, we usually assume that they care about fairness,
efficiency and their own wealth payoff, where the first two are related to their moral views.
However, when using a spectator design, the spectators’ concerns are limited to efficiency
and fairness, as the spectators have no potential financial gains related to their decision.
The spectators thus consider the fairness aspect, which would be to evenly distribute
income between the two workers to avoid an unequal income distribution that is due to
luck, i.e. to implement the egalitarian payment scheme. The efficiency consideration
would favor the payment scheme that maximizes the size of the pie, i.e. to implement the
non-egalitarian payment scheme. The information treatments in our experiment also give
the spectators a third moral aspect to consider; respecting the workers’ freedom of choice.
Given our design, to respect the workers’ freedom of choice is always to implement the
non-egalitarian payment scheme.
If the workers were to decide with certainty which of the payment schemes that was to be
implemented, it would be impossible to disentangle the effects of these considerations from
one another. However, because the spectator is a third party with no financial interest in
the outcome of his or her decision, we cleanly identify his or her moral views. The only
thing that can give the spectator utility is to choose what he or she thinks is morally
right, and thus the spectator design enables us to elicit the spectators’ moral views and
preferences.
3.3 Treatments
The experimental design largely depends on randomization of the spectators into differ-
ent treatments. The spectators are randomized into four different treatments described
in further detail later in this section. The randomization ensures that the four groups
are identical on both observable and unobservable characteristics, and thus the only dif-
ference between the groups is the treatment. The randomization of spectators into the
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different treatments means that if the groups on average make different choices, we can
infer a causal relationship between the treatment and differences between the groups’
answers.
The law of large numbers says that if the same trial is performed a large number of
times, the average value of the result will converge towards the expected value of the
population as the number of trials increases. Therefore, the randomization of spectators
into treatment groups, should on average make the groups equal with respect to both
observable and unobservable characteristics.
As a preliminary effort, we provide an overview of the data by looking at the characteristics
of the spectators. We acquired the data through a data collecting agency, and part of their
job is ensuring that the final sample of respondents is nationally representative. However,
it is still helpful to examine basic characteristics of the spectators, and especially whether
the treatment groups are similar with respect to different characteristics.
With 500 spectators in each of the four treatment groups for both Norway and the United
States, it could be that, by random, the spectators in each group are not equal on average.
Hence, it is useful to compare the groups on observable characteristics as a simplistic
test for representativeness across treatment groups. Table 3 and 4 show the mean and
standard deviation of the percentage of spectators being male, the age of the participants,
the household income and the share with higher education for each of the four treatment
groups.
Table 3: Summary statistics - Norwegian sample
Info - Ex ante Info - Ex post No info - Ex ante No info - Ex post
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Male 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.50
Age 49.01 16.74 49.22 17.30 48.98 17.11 49.57 17.21
Household income 804 423 384 272 754 887 358 907 768 305 352 546 761 220 358 049
High education 0.62 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.58 0.49
Conservative 0.29 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.46 0.26 0.44
Observations 500 500 500 500
Note: The table displays the descriptive statistics for the Norwegian spectator sample. The data points for the variable
"Household income" were reported in intervals of 100 000 NOK. The mean and standard deviation are calculated using the
upper bound of the intervals. The variable "High education" is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual has completed
higher education(university/college). The variable "Conservative" is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual would
have voted have voted for Høyre or Fremskrittspartiet.
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Table 4: Summary statistics - American sample
Info - Ex ante Info - Ex post No info - Ex ante No info - Ex post
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Male 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.50
Age 48.17 15.58 45.76 14.71 42.11 19.18 42.38 19.76
Household income 106 576 52 186 106 487 50 435 109 202 49 131 107 926 51 208
High education 0.78 0.41 0.76 0.43 0.80 0.40 0.74 0.44
Conservative 0.38 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.35 0.48
Observations 500 500 502 503
Note: The table displays the descriptive statistics for the American spectator sample. The data points for the variable
"Household income" were reported in intervals from 0 to 25 000 USD, from 25 000 to 50 000 USD, and then in intervals of
50 000 USD. The mean and standard deviation are calculated using the upper bound of the intervals. The variable "High
education" is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual has completed higher education(university/college). The
variable "Conservative" is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual would have voted have voted for the Republican
Party or the American Independent Party.
The randomization seems to have been successful, as it resulted in balanced baseline char-
acteristics. Both the mean and standard deviation are very similar for all characteristics
in both samples, and this suggests that both the randomization process and the sample
sizes are satisfactory in making the treatment groups comparable.
We used a 2 × 2 design where the spectators were divided into four treatments. The
treatments were the following: Ex ante information, Ex ante no information, Ex post
information and Ex post no information2. Our main focus is on the difference between
ex ante information and ex post information, i.e. on a comparison between making the
distributive choice ex post relative to ex ante in the information treatments.
3.3.1 Information versus no information
In the information treatments, the spectators were matched with a pair of workers who
had both chosen the non-egalitarian payment scheme. The spectators in this treatment
were informed about what the workers in their pair had chosen. In the no information
treatment, the spectators were not informed about what payment scheme the workers
in their pair preferred. We randomly allocated 1000 Norwegian spectators and 1000
American spectators to each of the two main treatment categories.
2The ex post treatment consisted of two subcategories: ex post A and ex post B. The categories are
mirroring each other, the only difference being whether worker A or worker B received the high payment.
The results from these two treatments are not statistically significant from each other, and we thus merge
the results together.
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We expected a large share of spectators to prefer the egalitarian payment scheme over
the non-egalitarian payment scheme in the no information treatments, despite the egal-
itarian scheme imposing an efficiency loss. We were interested in how this share would
change when the spectators got information that the workers themselves preferred the
non-egalitarian payment scheme. Having both the information treatment and the no in-
formation treatment enables us to identify to what extent the spectators respect the work-
ers’ freedom of choice. The difference in the share of spectators choosing to implement
the egalitarian payment scheme in the information and the no information treatments
identifies the effect of having information about the preferences of the workers.
3.3.2 Ex ante versus ex post
In the ex ante treatments, the spectators did not know whether worker A or worker B
was going to be the one who received the high payment if they chose the non-egalitarian
payment scheme, only that it was going to be decided by a random draw. In the ex post
treatment, half of the spectators were told that worker A would receive the high payment
and worker B the low payment if they chose to implement the non-egalitarian payment
scheme, while the other half of spectators had the opposite distribution of payments. This
means that in the ex post treatment, the random draw had taken place and the outcome
was known to the spectators, while in the ex ante treatment the spectators were asked to
choose between the egalitarian and non-egalitarian payment scheme without knowing the
outcome of the random draw. Hence, the only difference between ex ante and ex post in
both the information and no information treatment was whether the spectator knew who
of the workers was going to receive the high payment if the spectator chose to implement
the non-egalitarian payment scheme. It is the effect of knowing which worker will receive
the high payment, i.e. the ex post effect, that is the main focus of our analysis.
Each spectator was only in either the ex ante or the ex post treatment, meaning that we do
not observe the same spectator’s behavior in different settings. However, as the spectators
are randomized into treatments, the groups are on average statistically equal, and we can
thus compare the results across treatments. This enables us to identify the share violating
the dominance principle, which is the difference between the share implementing equality
ex ante and ex post.
In the no information treatments, choosing the non-egalitarian payment scheme involves
putting more weight on efficiency than equality. In the information treatments, choosing
the non-egalitarian payment scheme could also be a result of respecting the workers’
freedom of choice, as the spectators have information that the workers prefer the non-
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egalitarian payment scheme. Since obeying the ex ante Pareto principle means preferring
one prospect to another if all individuals concerned have a higher expected utility from
that prospect, we are only able to identify spectators who are ex ante Paretians in the
information treatments. This is the only treatment where the spectators can be sure that
both workers have a higher expected utility from the non-egalitarian payment scheme.
Thus, the spectators in the ex ante information treatment choosing to implement the
non-egalitarian payment scheme are ex ante Paretians. As the ex ante Paretians are only
revealed in the information treatment, we choose to focus on the ex post egalitarians in
the ex post information treatment as the share of people that are ex post egalitarians, as
opposed to the ex post egalitarians from the ex post no information treatment.
3.4 Survey design
In addition to the main question about the distributive choice, the spectators also had to
answer several background questions. Norstat, the Norwegian data collection agency, has
a standard set of background questions that all respondents are asked, and these questions
are asked before the main survey. This means that all background questions were asked
before the respondents were asked to make the distributive choice. To make the results
from the Norwegian sample comparable to the results from the American sample, the
American respondents also got the questions in this order.
3.5 Sample size
In statistical analysis, the number of observations is important for the precision of the
estimates, and a large number of observations makes it less likely that the results are due
to randomness and coincidences. If an analysis is based on a large number of observa-
tions, it is more likely that the results reflect the characteristics and preferences of the
population.
To analyze whether the sample size is sufficient, we can calculate the statistical power
of the experiment. The statistical power is the probability of correctly rejecting the null
hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false. To maximize the power is equivalent to
minimizing the probability of a type-II-error. The power of an experiment depends on
three factors; the number of observations, the level of statistical significance required and
the magnitude of the effect we want to detect. The higher the power, the more reliable
are the results from the experiment. A power of 0.8, which implies a 20 % risk for a
type-II-error, is commonly considered to be sufficient.
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The main binary hypothesis test in our experiment is whether the share implementing
equality is significantly different in the ex ante and the ex post treatments. For this test,
the power of our experiment is 0.8454, and hence our experiment has a 84.54 % probability
of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis. This must be considered sufficient.
In our study, we are mainly interested in the spectators’ choices. Because we had 1000
spectators in the information treatment in both the Norwegian and the American sample,
we needed at least 2000 workers who had chosen the non-egalitarian payment scheme for
both samples. As 90%, and not all of the workers, got their payment scheme decided by a
spectator, we needed at least 2222 workers to choose the non-egalitarian payment scheme
for both samples to end up with 2000 workers getting their payment scheme decided by
a spectator. As the spectators in the no information treatment did not know anything
about the choices of their workers, it was irrelevant which payment scheme their workers
had chosen. This means that if more than half of the workers chose the non-egalitarian
payment scheme, we would need 4444 workers for each of the spectator samples.
To get a sufficient share of the workers to choose the non-egalitarian payment scheme we
needed to set the payment in both the egalitarian and non-egalitarian payment scheme
correctly. The choice between the two payment schemes involves choosing between a safe
payment or a 50-50 possibility of receiving either a smaller payment or a higher payment
compared to the safe one. According to standard economic theory, people’s behavior
in these kind of choices is given by expected utility theory. When choosing between a
risky and a safe payment scheme, two important factors determine how desirable each
payment scheme is for the individual making the decision. First of all, the expected value
of the payment scheme is of importance, as monetary payments yield strictly positive
utility. Additionally, risk aversion determines how the trade-off between the expected
value of a prospect and the risk involved is made. A risk averse individual could turn
down a prospect yielding a higher expected value to a lower, but safer prospect, without
behaving irrationally. Risk aversion implies that the individual has decreasing marginal
utility of money, that is, they are maximizing a concave utility-of-wealth function. So as
the individual receives money, the utility gained from a given additional amount of money
will decrease. This makes the level of the stakes important for how the individual weighs
the risky payment scheme against the safe payment scheme.
If we look at the payment schemes we used in this experiment, the individuals could choose
between a safe payment of 2 USD or a risky payment scheme yielding a payment of either
1 USD or 5 USD, each with a probability of 50 %. As the payment in the risky payment
scheme has an expected value of 3 USD, a risk neutral individual would choose this over the
safe payment of 2 USD. The choice can be seen with the safe payment as a reference point,
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as this is the risk free option. That way choosing the safe payment scheme is turning down
a 50-50 gamble of losing 1 USD or gaining 3 USD. According to expected utility theory,
choosing the safe option must signify that you value the third dollar gained above the safe
payment at most (1/3) as much as you value the last dollar of the safe payment. This
sort of valuation of monetary amounts implies a ridiculously rapidly diminishing utility
of wealth. When this is applied to situations involving larger stakes, the corresponding
behavior would imply absurd levels of risk aversion. For instance, Rabin (2013) shows
that turning down a 50-50 bet of losing 100 USD or gaining 110 USD, implies a degree
of risk aversion leading to turning down a 50-50 bet of losing 1 000 USD and gaining
any sum. Therefore, following expected utility theory, to get an equal number of workers
choosing the egalitarian and the non-egalitarian payment scheme, the expected value of
the two schemes should be approximately equal.
However, there is reason to believe that people do not always behave in accordance to
expected utility theory, and that they exhibit risk averse behavior even in situations in-
volving low stakes. We therefore ran three pilots varying the amounts in the two payment
schemes before we started the main data collection. It was important that the amounts
were such that some people preferred the risky, non-egalitarian payment scheme while
others preferred the safe, egalitarian payment scheme, both among workers and specta-
tors. As people are more risk averse over low stakes than predicted by expected utility
theory, the expected value of the non-egalitarian payment scheme had to be substantially
higher than the expected value of the egalitarian payment scheme.
For this to happen, equality has to come with a cost. This also means that our design
mirrors the real world, where redistribution normally comes with a relatively high cost. An
example of redistribution that comes with a cost is taxes on goods and services. Taxes
are widely used to redistribute income in society and even out inequality. In markets
with perfect competition, a tax distorts the efficient market equilibrium and causes a
deadweight loss, which inflicts an economic cost on society.
With the amounts we chose, about 40 % of the workers chose the non-egalitarian pay-
ment scheme and 60 % chose the egalitarian payment scheme. We thus had to recruit
more than 4444 workers for both spectator samples to get a sufficient number of work-
ers who had chosen the non-egalitarian payment scheme. This gave both more workers
who chose the non-egalitarian payment scheme and who chose the egalitarian payment
scheme. For 90 % of the additional workers who chose the egalitarian payment scheme,
we recruited spectators on mTurk to decide the payment scheme. The distributive choices
of these spectators are not included in the analysis, as they are not made by a nationally
representative sample.
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One potential drawback with our design is that the stakes are relatively small. It is
reasonable to believe that people may have different preferences for amounts that are
economically more significant. The highest potential payment in our experiment is lower
than the minimum wage per hour in the US, which means that the stakes are relatively
small. The external validity might thus be limited to economic choices where the amounts
at stake are not too big. There has been done extensive research on how differences in
stakes influence decision making, but the results have been ambiguous. A robust finding
in the extensive literature on decision making in the ultimatum game has been that
responders to a large extent reject low offers in experiments with low stakes (Andersen
et al., 2011), and several researcher papers show that the results from the ultimatum
game do not change drastically when the stakes increase (Cameron (1999), Slonim and
Roth (1998), Munier and Zaharia (2002)). However, Andersen et al. find the opposite
and report that "(...) sufficiently high stakes lead responder behavior to converge almost
perfectly to full acceptance of low offers, even in the absence of learning.". It is thus hard
to know whether the behavior we observe in our experiment is valid also for larger stakes.
Nevertheless, most economic decisions in life involve small stakes, which means that our
results can provide useful insights into many everyday decisions.
4 Empirical Strategy
We first provide a description of our main analysis of the effect of making the distribu-
tive choice ex post, before we present a description of the heterogeneity and robustness
analysis. Finally, we describe the analysis of the effect of information.
4.1 Main analysis
The focus of this paper is on the results from the information treatments, and we therefore
only use data from these treatments when estimating the main empirical specification.
We assume that there in the ex post treatment is no reason for the spectators’ choice
to depend on whether worker A or worker B is the one receiving the high payment. We
would like to stress that there in neither of the treatments was an objective reason for
the spectators to prefer either of the workers to receive the high payment. The spectators
were told that the workers had completed the same task, and there was no mentioning of
different levels of effort or performance.
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The main empirical specification used in the analysis is:
ei = α + αPPi + δNi + γXi + εi (1)
where ei is a dummy indicating if spectator i implemented the egalitarian payment scheme.
Pi indicates if spectator i was in the ex post treatment. Ni indicates if spectator i was from
Norway. Xi is a vector including the background variables gender, political affiliation, age
and level of education.
The empirical specification from equation (1) gives us that the share of spectators violating
ex ante Pareto is α, the share violating ex post egalitarianism is (1 − α − αP ), and the
share violating dominance is αP .
The ex ante treatment is the reference category in equation (1). The estimates should
thus be interpreted relative to the ex ante situation, i.e. where the outcome of the random
draw deciding who of the workers will receive the high payment in the non-egalitarian
payment scheme has not yet taken place.
The estimated coefficients from equation (1) are the estimated causal effects of whether
the spectator is assessing the situation ex ante or ex post. The estimated causal effect
of being in the ex post treatment on the share who equalizes is given by αP . δ gives the
causal effect of being Norwegian rather than American.
4.2 Heterogeneity and robustness analysis
In the heterogeneity analysis we focus on gender, political affiliation and education. More
specifically, we test whether there are differences in treatment effects between males and
females, people with high and low education, and conservatives and non-conservatives.
We assume level of education to be a proxy for socioeconomic status.
A person in the United States is classified as conservative if he or she would have voted for
the Republicans or the American Independent Party, and a person in Norway is classified
as conservative if he or she would have voted for Høyre or Fremskrittspartiet. Persons
who would have voted for other parties are classified as non-conservative. A person is
classified as having high education if his or her highest level of completed education is
above high school.
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We first estimate whether there are differences in the ex post effect in the subgroups
when we specify for nationality, gender, political affiliation, age and level of education.
The specification is as follows:
ei = α + αPPi + δNi + α
B
PPiBi + γXi + εi (2)
In addition to the variables used in equation (1), we include an interaction term PiBi.
Bi, when interacted with Pi, indicates the background variable of choice, indicating that
spectator i is either classified as being Norwegian, female, conservative, 50 years or older
or having high education.
We then do the heterogeneity analysis of the ex post effect separately for Norway and the
United States using the following specification:
ei = α + αPPi + α
B
PPiBi + γXi + εi (3)
where Bi, when interacted with Pi, indicates the background variable of choice, indi-
cating that spectator i is either classified as being female, conservative or having high
education.
By running regressions of equations (2) and (3) with the different background variables,
we can investigate whether the causal effect of being in the ex post treatment varies
between the different subgroups. The estimated subgroup difference in the causal effect
of being in the ex post treatment is αBP .
For the heterogeneity analysis of the effect of being Norwegian for each of the three
background variables, we use the following specification:
ei = α + α
BBi + αPPi + α
B
PPiBi + δNi
+δBBiNi + δPPiNi + δ
B
P PiBiNi + γXi + εi
(4)
where Bi indicates the background variable of choice, indicating that spectator i is ei-
ther classified as being female, conservative, or having high education. In addition to the
variables used in equation (1), we include the interaction term PiBi and two new inter-
action terms, BiNi, that is an interaction between the background indicator variable and
the country indicator, and PiNi, which is an interaction between the treatment variable
and the country indicator. We also include a triple interaction term, PiBiNi, an interac-
tion between the treatment indicator variable, the background indicator variable and the
country indicator variable.
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By running regressions of equation (4) with the different background variables, we can
investigate whether the causal effect of being Norwegian varies between the different
subgroups. The estimated subgroup difference in the causal effect of being Norwegian is
δB in the ex ante treatments and δB + δBP in the ex post treatments.
Equation (4) can also be used to test the robustness of the main results from equation
(1). If the main results are also true for all subgroups, this shows that the results are
robust. For instance, we consider the result that people are more egalitarian in the ex
post treatment to be robust if we, in both the United States and in Norway, for all
background specifications, find a significant positive treatment effect of being in the ex
post treatment. Using the variables from equation (4), this means that the results from
equation (1) are robust if αP > 0 (American spectators, Bi = 0), αP +αBP > 0 (American
spectators, subgroup Bi = 1), αP + δP > 0 (Norwegian spectators, subgroup Bi = 0) and
αP + α
B
P + δP + δ
B
P > 0 (Norwegian spectators, subgroup Bi = 1).
To further test the robustness of our results, we also run all regressions using a probit
model. We compare the results from these regressions to the original results and see
whether they vary dramatically in magnitude and significance.
4.3 Analysis of the effect of information
In the analysis of the effect of information, we estimate the effect of being in one of the in-
formation treatments on the willingness to implement the egalitarian payment scheme. As
the spectators only receive information about the workers preferring the non-egalitarian
payment scheme, we believe that the information will reduce their willingness to imple-
ment the egalitarian payment scheme.
The empirical specification is the following:
ei = α + αPPi + δNi + φIi
+φPPiIi + φNNiIi + γXi + εi
(5)
where Ii indicates if spectator i was in one of the information treatments. In addition
to the variables used in equation (1), we also include an interaction between the ex
post treatment indicator variable and the information treatment indicator variable, PiIi,
and an interaction between the country indicator variable and the information treatment
indicator variable, NiIi.
The coefficients from equation (5) estimates the causal effect of being in the one of the
information treatments. The reference category is the no information treatments, and
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the estimates should thus be interpreted relative to this treatment. φP estimates the
difference in the effect of information between the ex ante and ex post and φP estimates
the difference in the effect of information between Norway and the United States.
5 Results
We begin by providing an overview of the spectators’ choices in the experiment in both
Norway and the United States. We then move on to an analysis of the effect of being in
the ex post treatment, the cross-country differences, the effect of information regarding
the workers’ preferences, and a heterogeneity and robustness analysis.
5.1 Main analysis
As we seek to investigate how people handle the conflict between the ex ante Pareto
principle, the dominance principle and the ex post egalitarianism principle, we created an
experimental setting where the spectators in the experiment made a distributive choice,
inevitably resulting in the rejection of one of the principles. This enables us to identify
which of the three principles the spectators rejected. Specifically, we are interested in the
participants obeying the ex post egalitarianism principle and which of the two remaining
principles they reject. Therefore, we focus on the information treatments, as it is not
possible to identify the spectators rejecting the ex ante Pareto principle using the no
information treatments. Hence, in the main analysis we only analyze the results from the
treatments ex ante information and ex post information.
To identify the spectators obeying the ex post egalitarianism principle, we look at the ex
post information treatment, as all spectators choosing to equalize payments between the
two workers in the ex post treatment are ex post egalitarians. They prefer the certain equal
outcome to the risky unequal one, even though the total payment to the workers is higher
when payments are not equalized, but determined through the non-egalitarian payment
scheme. That is, they are aware that the non-egalitarian payment scheme involves that
the workers in total receive 6 USD (5+1), while they in the egalitarian payment scheme
in total receive 4 USD (2+2). Additionally, the spectators in the ex post information
treatment are informed that both workers prefer the non-egalitarian payment scheme
over the egalitarian one. Hence, they are ex post egalitarians.
Figure 1 compares the share of spectators choosing the egalitarian payment scheme ex
ante and ex post, for Norway and the United States. In addition, it shows the share who
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equalizes when the Norwegian and American spectators are pooled together. The exact
shares are summarized in Table 5. The share who equalizes is larger in Norway than in
the United States in both treatments. For both countries, and thus also in the pooled
results, the share implementing equality is larger ex post than ex ante. This is in line
with what we would expect, as it seems reasonable to believe that more people see the
outcomes of the random draw as unfair when they are confronted more directly with the
inequality. In the ex post treatment, the spectators evaluate the payment schemes after
the random draw has taken place. When confronted with the final outcomes, instead of
the yet to occur inequality, the spectators might perceive the distribution as more unfair
and become less willing to choose the non-egalitarian payment scheme.
Table 5 shows that 74.8 % of the Norwegian spectators are ex ante egalitarians, and this
is in itself an interesting result. This means that a large share of the sample chooses not
to respect the individual preferences of the workers. This is especially surprising given our
design, as there is no reason for the spectators to presume that they are better suited to
make the decision than the workers themselves. The spectators are aware that they have
no additional information regarding the situation than the workers had when they chose
between the two payment schemes. There is no obvious reason for the spectators to believe
that the workers do not know their own good. The relatively small stakes involved make
the consequences of the final payment scheme too small for the spectators to reasonably
suspect that a worker is misjudging the potential downside of the non-egalitarian payment
scheme. Therefore, it is not clear that there are any reasons for the spectators to suspect
that the workers are behaving irrationally, and that it is in the workers’ own best interest
that their choice is overruled. Thus, spectators choosing the egalitarian payment scheme
in the information treatment are egalitarians and moral paternalists.
Table 5: Share who equalizes (information treatments)
Ex ante Ex post
Norway 74.8 % 82.4 %
United States 61.8 % 66.6 %
Pooled 68.3 % 74.5 %
Figure 1 shows that even though the results largely follow the same pattern in both
countries, there is a clear difference between the American and the Norwegian spectators in
the share of spectators choosing to equalize payments in both treatments. There is a lower
share of spectators choosing to equalize payments among the American spectators than
among the Norwegian spectators, which could suggest that Americans are less egalitarian
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than Norwegians in distributive choices. This will be discussed in further detail later in
this section.
The dominance principle implies that if in every state of the world, the outcomes of one
prospect are preferred to the outcomes of another prospect, then this prospect is preferred
to the other. In our context, if we compare the ex ante information treatment to the
ex post information treatment, the only difference between the treatments is that the
random draw in the non-egalitarian payment scheme has taken place, and thus the degree
of inequality is identical in both treatments. A rational spectator would perceive the ex
ante and ex post treatments as identical situations, as she only cares about final states.
Hence, according to the dominance principle, if a spectator prefers the egalitarian payment
scheme ex ante, then this should also be the preferred payment scheme ex post.
As our spectators are only in one of the treatments, we cannot directly observe whether
the same spectators choose differently depending on whether the distributive choice takes
place ex ante or ex post. In our design, no single spectator can reject the dominance
principle. It is only through a comparison of the ex ante and ex post that the dominance
rejecting spectators are revealed. We therefore make the assumption that the spectators
choosing the egalitarian payment scheme ex ante also would have chosen this payment
scheme ex post. Ex post, the inequality has arisen in the non-egalitarian payment scheme,
while it ex ante has yet to arise. Hence, the inequality is more evident ex post than ex
ante, and there is no obvious reason why a spectator preferring the egalitarian payment
scheme ex ante would not prefer the same payment scheme ex post. If anything, the
reasons for choosing the egalitarian payment scheme seem stronger ex post than ex ante.
Following this assumption, the share of ex post egalitarians who are changing their pre-
ferred payment scheme from non-egalitarian to egalitarian when going from ex ante to
ex post is found by taking the difference between the shares choosing to equalize ex ante
and ex post and divide it on the share of spectators equalizing ex post. The random-
ization of spectators into different treatments ensures that we can compare spectators
across treatments in this manner. Out of the ex post egalitarians, the share rejecting the
dominance principle is the share who changes their preferred payment scheme when the
distributive choice goes from taking place ex ante to ex post. That is, they are choosing
the non-egalitarian payment scheme in the ex ante treatment, but choosing the egali-
tarian payment scheme in the ex post treatment. In Figure 1, the share of spectators
rejecting the dominance principle is the difference between the two bars. In Norway, only
((0.824− 0.748)/0.824 = 0.0922) 9.22 % ex post egalitarians are rejecting the dominance
principle.
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The results shown in Figure 1 can also be used to calculate the share of egalitarians violat-
ing the ex ante Pareto principle. Obeying the ex ante Pareto principle implies respecting
the individual preferences of the workers. If a spectator believes that the workers are
taking a rational, utility maximizing decision when choosing between the two payment
schemes, a spectator obeying the ex ante Pareto principle would prefer that the payment
scheme preferred by both workers is implemented. This is because the fact that the work-
ers chose the non-egalitarian payment scheme indicates that this scheme maximizes the
expected utility of each worker. Additionally, the non-egalitarian payment scheme yields
a higher expected monetary payoff ex ante. In the information treatments, the spectators
are informed that both workers prefer the non-egalitarian payment scheme. Therefore, a
spectator implementing the egalitarian payment scheme in the ex ante information treat-
ment is violating the ex ante Pareto principle. Among the Norwegian spectators, 74.8 %
choose the egalitarian payment scheme in the ex ante treatment, and hence more than
(0.748/0.824 = 0.9078) 90 % of the ex post egalitarians are rejecting the ex ante Pareto
principle.
Table 6 shows the share of the ex post egalitarians who are rejecting the ex ante Pareto
principle and the dominance principle, both for Norway and the United States. In both
countries, an overwhelming majority of the ex post egalitarians are rejecting the ex ante
Pareto principle, and the shares are relatively equal in the two countries. As mentioned
earlier, our design forces the egalitarians to reject either the ex ante Pareto principle or
the dominance principle. Thus, the share of spectators not rejecting the ex ante Pareto
principle must be rejecting the dominance principle.
Table 6: Rejection of ex ante Pareto vs dominance
Ex ante Pareto Dominance
Norway 90.8 % 9.2 %
United States 92.8 % 7.2 %
Following this, our first result is that both Norwegians and Americans put more weight
on equality than efficiency and individual freedom of choice combined. 74.8 % of the
Norwegians and 61.8 % of the Americans reject the ex ante Pareto principle, and thus
reveal that they do not respect the workers’ choice of payment scheme. Choosing the other
alternative than the one the workers prefer when the workers are the only ones affected,
implies that they do not want to allow the workers to choose the risky prospect. These
spectators are not egalitarians because they want to equalize payments after the inequality
has arisen, but because they do not approve of the workers choosing the non-egalitarian
payment scheme and thus risk receiving the low payment. In our design, the inequality
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has arisen if the random draw in the non-egalitarian payment scheme has taken place,
which is the case in the ex post treatment. It is then clearly stated who is the "winner"
and who is the "loser" of the random draw. If the spectators had instead rejected the
dominance principle, they would be egalitarians because they wanted to equalize payments
after the inequality had arisen, even though they wanted to allow the workers to choose
the non-egalitarian payment scheme when the inequality had yet to arise.
Figure 1: Share who equalizes (information treatments)
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients from a regression of equation (1). We mainly
consider the estimates to be statistically significant if they are significant at the 5 %
level. The first two columns show the estimated coefficients for the Norwegian spectators,
column 3 and 4 show the coefficients for the American spectators, and column 5 and 6
show the estimates for the two countries pooled together. The reference category is the
ex ante information treatment. From the regression results, we find how the willingness
to implement the egalitarian payment scheme is affected by the spectators being in the
ex post treatment and by different background variables.
We start by looking at column 1 and 3 and compare the estimates for Norwegian and
American spectators with "Ex post" as the sole explanatory variable. The estimated
coefficient of the variable ex post, i.e. of being in the ex post treatment and knowing the
outcome of the random draw in the non-egalitarian payment scheme, is 0.0760 (p = 0.003)
in Norway and 0.0480 (p = 0.114) in the United States. The coefficient is statistically
significant in Norway, while it is not significant in the United States. This coefficient is
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the causal effect of being in the ex post treatment on the willingness to implement the
egalitarian payment scheme, which means that being in the ex post treatment increases
the willingness to implement the egalitarian payment scheme with 7.6 % in Norway.
The estimates are relatively unchanged when we include background variables in the
regressions (column 2 and 4), but the effect in the United States becomes statistically
significant at the 10 % level (p = 0.079).
From column 2 and 4, we see that being female increases the willingness to implement
the egalitarian payment scheme with 11.5 % (p < 0.001) in Norway and 8.0% (p =
0.008) in the United States. Both Norwegians and Americans who are 50 years or older
are significantly more willing than those under 50 to implement the egalitarian payment
scheme, with 13.2% (p < 0.001) in Norway and 15.4% (p < 0.001) in the United States.
The coefficient for high education is not significant in neither of the countries, and thus
we do not find socioeconomic status to have a significant effect on the willingness to
implement the egalitarian payment scheme. Being conservative has a significant effect on
the willingness to implement the egalitarian payment scheme both in Norway and in the
United States. In Norway, it reduces the willingness to implement the egalitarian payment
scheme with 6.6 % (p = 0.026), while it in the United States reduces the willingness to
implement the egalitarian payment scheme with 6.9% (p = 0.024). The effects of being
female, above 50 years or conservative are thus systematic across countries.
The results from the pooled regressions are shown in column 5 and 6. The treatment
indicator variable is significant at the 1 % level in both specifications (p = 0.002 and
p = 0.001), indicating that being in the ex post treatment significantly increases the
willingness to implement the egalitarian payment scheme. Column 6 shows the regression
of our main empirical specification, equation (1), and we see that being in the ex post
treatment increases the willingness to equalize payments with 6.7 % when the spectators
from Norway and the United States are pooled together.
The significance of the effect of being in the ex post treatment varies in the different
specifications in Table 7. While the effect of being in the ex post treatment is signifi-
cant at the 1 % level (p = 0.001) for the pooled results in column 6, the effect is only
significant at the 10 % level ( p = 0.079) in the United States, shown in column 4. The
corresponding estimate for Norway in column 2 is statistically significant at the 1 % level
(p = 0.004). In addition, the estimated effect is 7.3 % (p = 0.004) in Norway and 5.3 %
in the United States (p = 0.079), indicating that the magnitude of the effect is slightly
larger in Norway.
Our second result is thus that whether the spectators make the distributive choice ex ante
or ex post significantly affects their willingness to equalize payments. In other words,
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Norwegians’ and Americans’ willingness to implement the egalitarian payment scheme is
affected by whether the random draw in the non-egalitarian payment scheme has taken
place or not. However, while the effect is highly significant, it is relatively small. The
fact that the spectators’ willingness to equalize payments ex post is only 6.7 % higher
than ex ante, is consistent with the ex post egalitarians largely respecting the principle
of dominance, i.e. a large share is consistent in their choice of payment scheme regardless
of whether the random draw has taken place or not.
The indicator variable "Norway" is also significant in both column 5 and 6, and we see
that being Norwegian increases the willingness to implement the egalitarian payment
scheme ex ante. In the main specification with all control variables included (column
6), Norwegians are estimated to be 12.0 % (p < 0.001) more willing than Americans to
implement the egalitarian payment scheme in the ex ante treatment.
The main result following from these findings is that Norwegians are significantly more
egalitarian than Americans, even when they make distributive decisions in identical set-
tings. As mentioned above, Norwegians are on average more willing to implement the
egalitarian payment scheme than Americans ex ante. Relative to Americans, Norwegians
put more weight on equality than on efficiency and the workers’ individual freedom of
choice. This is in line with what we would expect from earlier research on Norwegians’
and Americans’ preferences. Norwegians are typically found to be more willing than
Americans to give up individual freedom to promote a common good, which is in line
with Norwegians being more egalitarian.
What is driving this difference between Norwegians and Americans is beyond the scope of
this thesis. It might be that Norwegians are less efficiency seeking than Americans, have
less respect for individual freedom of choice, are more opposed to gambling, or are more
concerned about equality. This would be an interesting question for future research.
Our main results from the analysis are the following:
• Result 1: The majority of both Norwegians and Americans reject the ex ante
Pareto principle. However, the share of egalitarians is higher in Norway than in the
United States, both ex ante and ex post.
• Result 2: Knowing the outcome of the random draw in the non-egalitarian payment
scheme significantly increases the willingness to implement the egalitarian payment
scheme.
• Result 3: Norwegians are significantly more willing than Americans to implement
equality.
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Table 7: Regression results on implemented equality (information treatments)
Norway Norway United States United States Pooled Pooled
Ex post 0.076∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.048 0.052∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020)
Norway 0.144∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Female 0.115∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.030) (0.020)
High age 0.132∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.030) (0.019)
High education -0.040 -0.029 -0.034
(0.026) (0.035) (0.021)
Conservative -0.066∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.022)
Constant 0.748∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.033) (0.022) (0.046) (0.018) (0.030)
R2 0.009 0.063 0.003 0.043 0.030 0.075
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 2000 2000
Note: The table reports the results from six robust OLS regressions of implemented equality on
different explanatory variables, including background variables. "Ex post" is an indicator vari-
able taking the value 1 if the spectator is in the ex post treatment. "Norway" is an indica-
tor variable taking the value 1 if the spectator is from Norway. "Female" is an indicator vari-
able taking the value 1 if the spectator is female, "High age" is an indicator variable taking the
value 1 if the spectator is 50 years or older, "High education" is an indicator variable taking the
value 1 if the spectator’s highest level of completed education is above high school and "Conser-
vative" is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the spectator is classified as conservative.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.2 Heterogeneity and robustness analysis
In this section, we first provide a heterogeneity analysis of the effect of being in the ex
post treatment. We then provide a heterogeneity analysis of the effect of being Norwegian
using equation (4). The analyses investigate whether there are differences between the
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subgroups. As mentioned in section 4.2, we focus on gender, education and political
affiliation.
Table 8 reports the estimated coefficients from six extended versions of the main empirical
specification, equation (1), providing a heterogeneity analysis of different subgroups with
the countries pooled together. The interaction terms test whether the effect of being
in the ex post treatment is different between subgroups, while the linear combinations
estimate the effect of the ex post treatment for the specified subgroup.
Column 1 shows the estimated coefficients from the main empirical specification with an
interaction term between the variables "Norway" and "Ex post". The estimated effect
of being in the ex post treatment in the United States is a 5.2 % (p = 0.082) increase
in willingness to equalize payments, and the effect is significant at the 10 % level. The
corresponding effect in Norway is 7.3 % (p = 0.004), indicating that Norwegians are more
affected by choosing ex post than Americans. The interaction between the indicator vari-
ables "Ex post" and "Norway" enables us to infer whether being in the ex post treatment
affects Norwegians and Americans differently. The interaction term is not statistically
significant, indicating that the difference in the difference is not significant, i.e. the effect
of choosing ex post is not significantly different in Norway and in the United States.
Column 2-6 show the heterogeneity analysis of different subgroups. Column 2 is the
heterogeneity analysis of gender. Both males and females are significantly affected by
choosing ex post, and the magnitude of the effect is almost identical. For males, the
willingness to equalize payments increases with 6.8 % (p = 0.019), while it increases with
5.7 % (p = 0.028) for females. The difference between males and females in the difference
between choosing ex ante and ex post is not statistically significant. The corresponding
differences for all other subgroups are also not statistically significant. Column 3 shows
the heterogeneity analysis of political affiliation. Non-conservatives are 7.7 % (p = 0.001)
more willing to implement the egalitarian payment scheme when choosing ex post than
when choosing ex ante, while choosing ex post has no significant effect on conservatives’
willingness to equalize payments. Column 4 shows that people below the age of 50 are
7.7 % (p = 0.006) more willing to equalize payments ex post than ex ante, while the
effect of choosing ex post on the willingness to equalize payments is smaller, but only
statistically significant at the 10 % level for people above the age of 50. Column 5 shows
the heterogeneity analysis of education. For people with low education, their willingness
to implement the egalitarian payment scheme is not significantly affected by choosing ex
post, while people classified as having high education increase their willingness to equalize
payments with 6.9 % (p = 0.004) when choosing ex post rather than ex ante.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity analysis on implemented equality (information treatments)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ex post 0.052∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.049 0.069
(0.030) (0.029) (0.022) (0.028) (0.033) (0.055)
Norway 0.109∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030)
Norway x Ex post 0.022 0.022
(0.039) (0.040)
Female x Ex post -0.010 -0.012
(0.039) (0.039)
Conservative x Ex post -0.044 -0.041
(0.041) (0.041)
High age x Ex post -0.033 -0.028
(0.039) (0.039)
High education x Ex post 0.020 0.021
(0.041) (0.042)
Constant 0.563∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.041)
Control variables X X X X X X
R2 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.076
Observations 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
lincom:
Ex post (B) 0.073∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.032 0.045∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.036) (0.035) (0.026) (0.024)
Note: The table reports the results from six robust OLS regressions of implemented equality on
different explanatory variables, including background variables. All background variables from Ta-
ble 7 are included in the regression. The linear combination is the effect of being in the ex post
treatment for subgroup B, which is the subgroup interacted with "Ex post" in the relevant column.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9 and 10 show a heterogeneity analysis of the ex post effect on gender, political
affiliation and socioeconomic status for Norway and the United States respectively. Hence,
this is a thorough heterogeneity analysis of result 2, i.e. that choosing ex post significantly
increases the willingness to equalize payments.
We start with the analysis of Table 9. From column 2, we observe that choosing ex post
has a significant effect on both Norwegian males (p = 0.026) and females (p = 0.062),
and the magnitude of the effect is almost the same. The estimated difference in the ex
post treatment effect is not statistically significant (p = 0.570), indicating that males and
females in Norway are not affected significantly different by choosing ex post. Hence, we
do not observe significant heterogeneity for these subgroups and result 2 holds for both
males and females in Norway.
From column 3, we observe that knowing the outcome of the random draw has a large
and significant effect on conservatives in Norway (p = 0.013), while the effect on non-
conservatives is less than half (p = 0.066). The estimated difference in the ex post
treatment is, however, not significant (p = 0.202). For political affiliation, we thus do
not observe significant heterogeneity in Norway and as for gender, result 2 holds for both
subgroups.
Column 4 is the heterogeneity analysis of education, which we use as a proxy for so-
cioeconomic status. Choosing ex post has a significant effect on Norwegians with high
education (p = 0.008), while the effect on Norwegians with low education is smaller and
not statistically significant (p = 0.197). The estimated difference in the ex post treatment
is not significant (p = 0.473). Thus, we do not observe a socioeconomic gradient in the
willingness to equalize payments in Norway. However, result 2 does not seem to hold for
Norwegians with low education.
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Table 9: Heterogeneity analysis on implemented equality (information treatments, Nor-
way)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ex post 0.073∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.053∗ 0.050 0.043
(0.025) (0.040) (0.029) (0.039) (0.052)
Female x Ex post -0.029 -0.023
(0.051) (0.051)
Conservative x Ex post 0.075 0.073
(0.059) (0.059)
High education x Ex post 0.037 0.035
(0.051) (0.051)
Constant 0.671∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.041)
Control variables X X X X X
R2 0.063 0.063 0.065 0.063 0.065
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
lincom:
Ex post (B) 0.059∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.052) (0.033)
Note: The table reports the results from five robust OLS regressions of im-
plemented equality on different explanatory variables, including background vari-
ables. All background variables from Table 7 are included in the regression.
The linear combination is the effect of being in the ex post treatment for sub-
group B, which is the subgroup interacted with "Ex post" in the relevant column.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10 provides the same heterogeneity analysis for the United States. From the second
column, we observe that American females and males are almost identically responsive
to the ex post treatment, but neither of these effects, nor the difference between them
is statistically significant (p = 0.923). It thus follows that result 2 does not hold for
American males and females, however we do not observe significant heterogeneity between
the subgroups.
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From column 3, we observe that in the United States, choosing ex post has a large and
significant effect on non-conservatives (p = 0.005), while it has a slight negative, but not
significant effect on conservatives (p = 0.571). The estimated difference in the ex post
treatment is significant (p = 0.026), indicating that American conservatives and non-
conservatives are differently affected by choosing ex post. We thus observe significant
heterogeneity between conservatives and non-conservatives, and we also have that result
2 does not hold for American conservatives.
Column 4 is the heterogeneity analysis of socioeconomic status. In the United States,
people with high and low education are close to identically responsive to the effect of
choosing ex post, and the difference between them is not statistically significant (p =
0.919). Thus, we do not observe a socioeconomic gradient in the willingness to equalize
payments in the United States. However, result 2 does not hold for people with high and
low education in the United States.
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Table 10: Heterogeneity analysis on implemented equality (information treatments,
United States)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ex post 0.053∗ 0.050 0.097∗∗∗ 0.047 0.090
(0.030) (0.042) (0.035) (0.061) (0.075)
Female x Ex post 0.006 -0.002
(0.060) (0.060)
Conservative x Ex post -0.125∗∗ -0.125∗∗
(0.056) (0.056)
High education x Ex post 0.007 0.011
(0.070) (0.070)
Constant 0.562∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.047) (0.046) (0.054) (0.058)
Control variables X X X X X
R2 0.043 0.043 0.047 0.043 0.047
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
lincom:
Ex post (B) 0.056 -0.027 0.054
(0.042) (0.048) (0.034)
Note: The table reports the results from five robust OLS regressions of im-
plemented equality on different explanatory variables, including background vari-
ables. All background variables from Table 7 are included in the regression.
The linear combination is the effect of being in the ex post treatment for sub-
group B, which is the subgroup interacted with "Ex post" in the relevant column.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We use Table 11 for the heterogeneity analysis of the effect of being Norwegian, i.e. result
3. A table with the estimates of the linear combinations testing whether the effect of
being Norwegian is significantly different for different subgroups is included in section
8.4 in the appendix. From the first column in Table 11 we observe that ex ante, both
Norwegian males (p = 0.051) and females (p = 0.001) are significantly more willing to
implement the egalitarian payment scheme than American males and females. However,
the difference in how males and females are affected by being Norwegian in the ex ante
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treatment is not significant (p = 0.364). The pattern is the same ex post (males: (p =
0.002), females: (p < 0.001), difference: (p = 0.729)). This is in line with result 3, and
we do not observe any heterogeneity between the subgroups.
From the second column, we observe that Norwegian non-conservatives ex ante are sig-
nificantly more willing to equalize payments than American non-conservatives ex ante (p
< 0.001), while Norwegian conservatives ex ante only are slightly more willing to equal-
ize payments than American conservatives ex ante, and the effect is not significant (p
= 0.263). However, the estimated difference of the effect of being Norwegian is not sig-
nificant (p = 0.127). Ex post, both Norwegian conservatives and non-conservatives are
significantly more willing to implement the egalitarian payment scheme than American
conservatives and non-conservatives in the same treatment. However, the effect of being
Norwegian in the ex post treatment is much larger for conservatives, and the difference
between Norwegian conservatives and non-conservatives is significant at the 10 % level
(p = 0.075). Thus, we do observe some heterogeneity ex post, but not ex ante. For all
subgroups except for American conservatives ex ante, the estimates are in line with result
3.
From the last column, we observe that both Norwegians with high and low education are
significantly more willing to implement the egalitarian payment scheme than Americans.
This is true both ex ante and ex post. The effect of being Norwegian is not significantly
different for people with high and low education (ex ante: (p = 0.671) and ex post: (p =
0.979)). Hence, the estimates are in line with result 3 and we do not observe significant
heterogeneity between these subgroups.
The main findings from the heterogeneity analysis are the following:
Result 5: In Norway, we do not observe significant heterogeneity in the ex post effect.
However, in the United States, we have significant heterogeneity among conservatives and
non-conservatives in the effect of being in the ex post treatment. Ex post, we observe
significant heterogeneity for conservatives and non-conservatives in the effect of being
Norwegian. However, for most of our subgroups, we do not observe significant hetero-
geneity.
• Gender: We do not observe any heterogeneity between males and females, neither
in the effect of being in the ex post treatment nor in the effect of being Norwegian.
• Political affiliation: We observe significant heterogeneity between American con-
servatives and non-conservatives in the effect of the ex post treatment. We also
observe significant heterogeneity between conservatives and non-conservatives in
the ex post treatment in the effect of being Norwegian.
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• Education: For education, we find no significant heterogeneity. This is true for
both the effect of being in the ex post treatment and the effect of being Norwegian.
The results from table 11 can also be used in the robustness analysis. We test whether
result 2 and 3 from the main analysis are robust by following the procedure described in
section 4.
We first check the robustness of result 2, which is that being in the ex post treatment
significantly increases the spectators’ willingness to implement the egalitarian payment
scheme. By inspecting the first three rows of linear combinations and the estimates for the
variable "Ex post", we find that the effect of being in the ex post treatment is positive
in all relevant subgroups except for conservatives in the United States where being in
the ex post treatment decreases the willingness to implement the egalitarian payment
scheme with 2.7 %. This estimate is, however, not statistically significant. Even though
the remaining 11 subgroups in Table 11 all have positive estimates of being in the ex
post treatment, the significance of these estimates vary between being significant at the
1 % level, to not being significant at the 10 % level for several other subgroups. Out
of the twelve estimated coefficient, only six of them are significant using a 10 % level of
significance. Nonetheless, the estimates do not vary substantially in magnitude, and for
most subgroups the estimated effect lies between 4 % and 9 %. As half of the estimates
are not significant, result 2 is not a robust finding.
We can also use Table 11 to check the robustness of result 3, which is that Norwegians are
significantly more willing than Americans to implement the egalitarian payment scheme.
By looking at the bottom three rows of linear combinations and the estimates for the
variable "Norway" we see how the estimated effect varies across subgroups. For all 12
subgroups the estimated effect of being Norwegian is positive, and this effect is significant
at the 10 % level for all subgroups except for conservatives in the ex ante treatment. For
the majority of the subgroups there is a large and strongly significant effect. The result
that Norwegians are significantly more willing to implement equality than American thus
seems to be a robust result across different subgroups.
As the dependent variable in our regressions is a dummy variable, it is possible to use a
probit model instead of a linear regression model estimated by using the ordinary least
squares method (OLS), which we have used. While our dependent variable only takes the
value of either 0 or 1, the ordinary least squares could make predictions for the value of the
dependent variable that is outside of this interval. A probit model however, estimates the
probability that the dependent variable equals 1 given the specified characteristics.
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To further check the robustness of our estimation results, we also estimate Table 7, 8,
11 and 14 using a probit model. These estimation results are shown in Table 17, 18, 21
and 22 in section 8.5 in the appendix. If the results are robust they should not change
drastically when going from an ordinary least squares to a probit model.
The estimates from Table 7 barely change when we use a probit model instead of OLS. The
estimated coefficients only experience minor changes and the significance of the coefficients
are not affected. The same is true for the results from Table 8. Compared to the original
Table 11, the estimated coefficient for the variable "B x Norway" in column 2 goes from
not being significant to being significant at the 10 % level when using a probit model, but
the rest of the coefficients from the table do not experience changes in the significance and
only experience minor changes in the estimated coefficients. For Table 14, the estimates
of both the interaction term "Norway x Ex post" and "Norway x Information" changes
the sign when going from the OLS to the probit model. However, the estimated effects are
negligible and not statistically significant in any of the models. The rest of the estimated
coefficients do not change dramatically and neither does the significance. As the results
from our analysis only experience minor changes when going from an OLS to a probit
model, our results seem to be robust.
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Table 11: Heterogeneity analysis on implemented equality (information treatments)
Gender Political Education
(B=1 if Female) (B=1 if Conservative) (B=1 if High)
Ex post 0.049 0.096∗∗∗ 0.046
(0.042) (0.035) (0.061)
Ex post x Norway 0.038 -0.042 0.005
(0.058) (0.045) (0.072)
Ex post x B 0.005 -0.123∗∗ 0.008
(0.059) (0.056) (0.070)
Ex post x B x Norway -0.033 0.195∗∗ 0.028
(0.078) (0.081) (0.086)
B x Norway 0.052 -0.088 -0.027
(0.057) (0.058) (0.063)
Norway 0.083∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.043) (0.035) (0.053)
B 0.077∗ -0.015 -0.031
(0.043) (0.038) (0.051)
Constant 0.574∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.049)
With controls X X X
R2 0.075 0.078 0.075
Observations 2000 2000 2000
lincom:
Ex post (US, B) 0.055 -0.027 0.054
(0.042) (0.048) (0.034)
Ex post (Norway, not B) 0.088∗∗ 0.054∗ 0.051
(0.040) (0.029) (0.039)
Ex post (Norway, B) 0.060∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.051) (0.033)
Norway (Ex ante, B) 0.135∗∗∗ 0.055 0.099∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.049) (0.035)
Norway (Ex post, not B) 0.121∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.032) (0.050)
Norway (Ex post, B) 0.140∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.051) (0.032)
Note: The table reports the results from three robust OLS regressions on different explana-
tory variables, including background variables, and interaction terms with the subgroups spec-
ified in equation (4). B is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the spectator is female (column
1), is conservative (column 2), or has high education (column 3). All background variables
from Table 7 are also included in the regression, except the background variable captured in B.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5.3 Effect of information
The treatments where the spectators were given no information about the workers’ pref-
erences enable us to estimate the effect of knowing the workers’ preferences by comparing
the results from these treatments to the results from the information treatments. If a
spectator chooses to implement the non-egalitarian payment scheme in the no informa-
tion treatments, it is not out of respect for the workers’ preferences, as the spectator
does not know their preferences in this treatment. The effect the information about the
workers’ preferences has on the spectators’ choice is revealed through the difference be-
tween the share of spectators choosing to implement the non-egalitarian payment scheme
in the information and no information treatments. It seems reasonable to believe that
the spectators choosing to implement the non-egalitarian payment scheme in the no in-
formation treatments choose this option out of efficiency reasons. The non-egalitarian
payment scheme is the payment scheme that maximizes the size of the pie, and it is
hard to see other reasons than efficiency making the spectators in the no information
treatments choose this payment scheme over the egalitarian payment scheme.
However, in the information treatments, there are two reasons for choosing the non-
egalitarian payment scheme. As in the no information treatments, the non-egalitarian
payment scheme maximizes the size of the pie. In addition, choosing the non-egalitarian
payment scheme involves respecting the workers’ preferences. This is opposed to the sit-
uation in the no information treatments, where the spectators do not know the workers’
preferences and thus they cannot know if they choose in accordance with the workers’ pref-
erences. It thus follows that the difference between the share implementing the egalitarian
payment scheme in the no information treatments versus the information treatments is
the share of spectators choosing to implement the non-egalitarian payment scheme as a
result of getting an additional reason for choosing this payment scheme, i.e. respect for the
workers’ preferences. However, the information treatments do not enable us to distinguish
between the spectators choosing the non-egalitarian payment scheme only because it im-
plies respecting the workers preferences and the spectators choosing the non-egalitarian
payment scheme because it is both efficient and implies respecting the workers’ pref-
erences. We assume that the spectators choosing the non-egalitarian payment scheme
without information also would have chosen this payment scheme with information, as
the information must be seen as favoring the non-egalitarian payment scheme. We can
thus infer that the additional non-egalitarians in the information treatments relative to
the no information treatments are the ones that would not have chosen the non-egalitarian
payment scheme in the absence of the argument of doing so out of respect for the workers’
preferences. However, we cannot identify whether this argument alone would have been
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enough to make them choose the non-egalitarian payment scheme. Hence, the no infor-
mation treatments enable us to estimate the share of non-egalitarians driven by efficiency
considerations and the share driven by either a combination of efficiency and respect for
the workers’ preferences or only by respect for the workers’ preferences.
From Table 12 we find the share of spectators choosing the non-egalitarian payment
scheme who would not have chosen this payment scheme if efficiency was the only ar-
gument for doing so, i.e. the reduction in the share who equalizes when comparing the
treatments with and without information. By comparing the difference between ex ante
no information and ex ante information in Table 12, we find that receiving information
regarding the workers’ preferences reduces the share implementing the egalitarian pay-
ment scheme by 13.6 % in Norway and 11.5 % in the United States, giving an average
of 12.5 %. Ex post, the share choosing the non-egalitarian payment scheme because they
receive information regarding the workers’ preferences is 11.2 % in Norway and 15.3 %
in the United States, giving an average of 13.2 %. Norwegian spectators are thus more
affected by information regarding the workers’ preferences in the ex ante treatments than
in the ex post treatments, while the opposite is true for Americans.
Table 12: Share who equalizes
Ex ante no info Ex ante info Ex post no info Ex post info
Norway 88.4 % 74.8 % 93.6 % 82.4 %
United States 73.3 % 61.8 % 81.9 % 66.6 %
Pooled 80.8 % 68.3 % 87.7 % 74.5 %
From Table 13 we see that both ex ante and ex post, a majority of the non-egalitarians
in Norway choose the non-egalitarian payment scheme because they get additional infor-
mation regarding the workers’ preferences. The largest share is in the ex post treatments,
with ((0.936 - 0.824)/(1 - 0.824) = 0.636) 63.6 %. In contrast, a majority of the non-
egalitarians in the United States choose the non-egalitarian payment scheme only because
of efficiency considerations. The smallest share is in the ex ante treatments, with only
((0.733 - 0.618)/(1 - 0.618) = 0.301) 30.1 %. This implies that for 69.9 % of the non-
egalitarian Americans in this treatment, the non-egalitarian payment scheme being the
efficient payment scheme is sufficient reason to choose it over the egalitarian payment
scheme. Thus, the main motivation for choosing the non-egalitarian payment scheme is
different in Norway and in the United States.
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Table 13: Share of non-egalitarians choosing the non-egalitarian payment scheme because
of the additional information regarding the workers’ preferences
Ex ante info Ex post info
Norway 54.0 % 63.6 %
United States 30.1 % 45.8 %
Pooled 39.4 % 51.8 %
Table 14 reports the results from a regression on implemented equality using the data from
the Norwegian and the American spectators in both the information and no information
treatments. The table includes four regressions with different interaction terms. The no
information treatment is the reference category in Table 14 and the estimates are therefore
to be interpreted relative to this category.
Column 1 reports the estimated coefficients from a regression of equation (1) extended
with a variable indicating whether the spectator was in one of the information treatments.
Using the indicator variable "Information" along with interactions enables us to estimate
the effect of information. From column 1, we see that being in the information treatments
reduces the willingness to implement the egalitarian payment scheme by 12.9 % (p <
0.001). This is in line with what we would expect, as being in one of the information
treatments involves being informed that both of the workers have stated that they prefer
the non-egalitarian payment scheme. Hence, compared to the no information treatments
there is an additional reason to not implement the egalitarian payment scheme. The effect
of being in the ex post treatment is statistically significant at the 1 % level in all four
specifications. That is, there is a statistically significant effect of the random draw having
taken place also when we include the no information treatments.
From column 2, 3 and 4, we see that the effect of knowing the workers’ preferences is
not significantly different depending on whether the spectator is in the ex ante or the
ex post treatment or on whether the spectator is Norwegian or American. The effect of
information in these specifications is however relatively unchanged compared to column
1, varying from 12.6 % to 13.6 %.
As in the results from Table 7, Norwegians are significantly more willing than Americans
to implement equality across treatments. Specifically, column 1 shows that a Norwegian
spectator is 11.7 % (p < 0.001) more willing to implement the egalitarian payment scheme
than an American spectator.
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The main finding from the regression analysis is the following:
• Result 4: Knowing that the workers prefer the non-egalitarian payment scheme
significantly reduces the willingness to implement the egalitarian payment scheme.
Table 14: Regression results on implemented equality (all treatments)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ex post 0.065∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
Norway 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Information -0.129∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024)
Ex post x Information -0.005 -0.005
(0.025) (0.025)
Norway x Information 0.014 0.014
(0.025) (0.025)
Constant 0.696∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
With controls X X X X
R2 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093
Observations 4005 4005 4005 4005
Note: The table reports the results from four robust OLS regressions of imple-
mented equality on different explanatory variables, including background vari-
ables. All background variables from Table 7 are included in the regression.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
6 Concluding Remarks
We have reported the results from a large-scale economic experiment on distributive pref-
erences conducted with representative samples from Norway and the United States.
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We find that a majority of both the egalitarian Norwegians and Americans are rejecting
the ex ante Pareto principle. In other words, when they ex ante choose a payment scheme
for two other people, they prefer the egalitarian payment scheme over the non-egalitarian
payment scheme, even when the two people themselves prefer the non-egalitarian payment
scheme. Rejecting the ex ante Pareto principle means that they are equalizing earnings
before the inequality has arisen. Put differently, the majority of the egalitarians are
not egalitarians simply because they want to redistribute earnings in a situation where
inequalities have arisen. Rather, they are moral paternalists preventing workers from
choosing a risky, non-egalitarian payment scheme.
When the spectators know the workers’ preferences, we find the willingness to equalize
payments to be dependent on whether the random draw in the non-egalitarian payment
scheme has taken place. People become more egalitarian when they are confronted with
the unequal distribution of income in the non-egalitarian payment scheme. That is, the
timing of the inequality significantly affects people’s preferences. They are more will-
ing to restrict the workers from choosing the non-egalitarian payment scheme when the
inequality has arisen, than when it is yet to arise.
Our results demonstrate cross-country differences between Norway and the United States
when it comes to the willingness to implement the egalitarian payment scheme. In line
with earlier research, we find that Norwegians are more egalitarian than Americans. How-
ever, among the egalitarians, the shares violating the ex ante Pareto principle and the
dominance principle are relatively equal across the two countries.
We find that knowing the workers’ preferences for the non-egalitarian payment scheme
decreases the willingness to implement the egalitarian payment scheme. In Norway, a ma-
jority of the non-egalitarians choose the non-egalitarian payment scheme because they get
additional information regarding the workers’ preferences. For the rest of the Norwegian
non-egalitarians, the efficiency argument is sufficient for them to prefer the non-egalitarian
payment to the egalitarian payment scheme. In contrast, only a minority of the American
non-egalitarians choose the non-egalitarian payment scheme because they get additional
information regarding the workers’ preferences.
We have shown that both Norwegians and Americans, when making distributive choices
on behalf of others, put significantly more weight on equality, than choosing in accordance
with the affected parties’ preferences. We also find that people are willing to act as moral
paternalists, even over small stakes, and when it comes with a cost.
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The workers were randomly assigned to one of four different treatments. Within each
treatment the workers were randomly assigned to one of five different age treatment.
Below the hypothetical situation presented in the four different treatments are shown.
The X’s were replaced with either 6, 9, 12, 15 or 18, depending on the age treatment the
worker was randomized into.
Treatment 1
Two X-year olds have agreed to bet a week’s pocket money on a game of dice. They put
equal amounts of money into the pot, and agree that whoever gets the highest dice roll
will get the whole amount.
What would you do if you had to decide whether the X-year olds should be allowed to
play or not?
• Alt 1: I would allow them to play
• Alt 2: I would not allow them to play
Treatment 2
Two X-year olds have agreed to bet a week’s pocket money on a game of dice. They put
equal amounts of money into the pot, and agree that whoever gets the highest dice roll
will get the whole amount. Both rolled the dice and one of them got a higher dice roll
and thus won the whole amount.
What would you do if you had to decide whether the X-year old who won should keep
the whole amount or whether the amount should be equally divided?
• Alt 1: I would allow the winner to keep the whole amount
• Alt 2: I would divide the amount equally between them
Treatment 3
Two X-year olds have agreed to play a game with a week’s pocket money at stake. They
put equal amounts of money into the pot, and agree that whoever wins the game gets the
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whole amount.
What would you do if you had to decide whether the X-year olds should be allowed to
play or not?
• Alt 1: I would allow them to play
• Alt 2: I would not allow them to play
Treatment 4
Two X-year olds have agreed to play a game with a week’s pocket money at stake. They
put equal amounts of money into the pot, and agree that whoever wins will get the whole
amount. One of them won the game and thus got the whole amount.
What would you do if you had to decide whether the X-year old who won should keep
the whole amount or whether the amount should be equally divided?
• Alt 1: I would allow the winner to keep the whole amount
• Alt 2: I would divide the amount equally between them
8.1.2 Follow-up question
Additionally, the workers were randomly asked either follow-up question A or B.
Question A
You answered "Worker’s answer from previous question here". What are your main
reason(s) for this decision?
- (Open answer)
Question B
You answered "Worker’s answer from previous question here". Was any of the following
considerations important for your decision? (1 = not important – 7 = highly impor-
tant)
• The competence of individuals this age (1 = not important – 7 = highly important)
• The maturity of individuals this age (1 = not important – 7 = highly important)
• The appropriateness of betting money for individuals this age (1 = not important
– 7 = highly important)
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• The addictiveness of betting money for individuals this age (1 = not important – 7
= highly important)
• The unfairness of the inequality between the winner and the looser (1 = not impor-
tant – 7 = highly important)
8.1.3 Statements
Please indicate to what extent you agree to the following statements (1 = highly agree -
7 = highly disagree)
• Parents should interfere with the choices of their children if it is in the best interest
of the children (1 = highly agree - 7 = highly disagree)
• Teachers should interfere with the choices of the children they teach if it is in the
best interest of the children (1 = highly agree - 7 = highly disagree)
• Adults in general should interfere with the choices of children if it is in the best
interest of the children (1 = highly agree - 7 = highly disagree
• The government should interfere with the choices of children if it is in the best
interest of the children (1 = highly agree - 7 = highly disagree)
• The government should interfere with the choices of parents if it is in the best
interest of their children (1 = highly agree - 7 = highly disagree)
• Children should be required to exercise because it is in the children’s best interest
(1 = highly agree - 7 = highly disagree)
• Children should be required to eat healthy because it is in the children’s best interest
(1 = highly agree - 7 = highly disagree)
• Children should be required to read books because it is in the children’s best interest
(1 = highly agree - 7 = highly disagree)
• The government should interfere with the choices of its citizens if it is in the best
interest of the citizens (1 = highly agree - 7 = highly disagree)
• The government should require people to save for retirement because it is in people’s
best interest (1 = highly agree - 7 = highly disagree)
• The government should require motorcyclists to wear helmets because it is in the
motorcyclists’ best interest (1 = highly agree - 7 = highly disagree)
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8.1.4 Background questions
The workers where asked about their gender, year of birth, number of people in household,
number of people in the household under the age of 18, the year of birth of all children
in teh household, occupation, sector, annual income, level of education, marital status,
political affiliation and religious view.
8.1.5 Choice of payment scheme
You have now completed your work on the assignment. We will now explain how you will
be paid for this work. After you have completed this HIT, we will for each assignment
match you with another participant who has completed the same assignment. The pay-
ments to you and the other participant is determined by a two-stage process. Below we
explain this process in more detail.
First stage:
First, we would like to know which of the two payment schemes you prefer:
I: By a lottery where with equal probabilities one of you are paid 5 USD and the other is
paid 1 USD for the assignment.
II: Both of you are paid 2 USD for the assignment.




We will ask the participant you are paired with to make the same choice and with a given
probability, the choice of the other participant will determine how the two of you are
paid.
Second stage:
If neither your choice nor the choice of the other participant is chosen to determine
payments, we will ask a third party to determine the payment to the two of you. You will
receive your payment for the assignment within three weeks and it will be paid separately
from your fixed participation fee of 1 USD.
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8.2 Spectator survey
This is the spectator survey as it was presented to the American spectators in our sample.
The Norwegian spectators got the same survey, only translated to Norwegian.
8.2.1 Distributive choice
This section contains the distributive choice as presented to the spectators in the different
treatments.
Treatment 1 - Ex Ante:
We will now ask you to make a choice that has consequences for a real situation. A
couple of days ago two workers, A and B, were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
to participate in a study. They were each paid 1 USD for participating, but were also
able to earn more during the study.
In the study, the two participants were asked to complete a task. After the task was
completed the participants were asked which of the two following payments schemes they
preferred:
• I: By a random draw it will be decided who of the two will receive 5 USD for the
task and who will receive 1 USD for the task.
• II: Both will be paid 2 USD for the task.
The participants were informed that their answers with a certain probability would be
drawn to determine the payment between them. Alternatively, it would be determined by
a third party. Both participants answered that they preferred I, but their answer was not
drawn to determine the payment - the payment will therefore be determined by a third
party.
You are this third party, and we now want you to choose how the two participants will
be paid. The participants will be paid according to what you decide within three weeks.
You can choose between:
• I: By a random draw it will be decided who of the two will receive 5 USD for the
task and who will receive 1 USD for the task.
• II: Both will be paid 2 USD for the task.
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I choose: I or II (no other answers allowed)
Treatment 2 - Ex Post Alternative A:
We will now ask you to make a choice that has consequences for a real situation. A
couple of days ago two workers, A and B, were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
to participate in a study. They each earned 1 USD by participating, but were also able
to earn more during the study.
In the study, the two participants were asked to complete a task. After the task was
completed the participants were asked which of the two following payments schemes they
preferred:
• I: By a random draw it will be decided who of the two will receive 5 USD for the
task and who will receive 1 USD for the task.
• II: Both will be paid 2 USD for the task.
The participants were informed that their answers with a certain probability would be
drawn to determine the payment between them. Alternatively, it would be determined by
a third party. Both participants answered that they preferred I, but their answer was not
drawn to determine the payment - the payment will therefore be determined by a third
party.
You are this third party, and we now want you to choose how the two participants will
be paid. The participants will be paid according to what you decide within three weeks.
You can choose between:
• I-A: Participant A will be paid 5 USD for the task and participant B will be paid 1
USD for the task
• II: Both will be paid 2 USD for the task.
I choose: I-A or II (no other answers allowed)
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Treatment 3 - Ex Post Alternative B:
We will now ask you to make a choice that has consequences for a real situation. A
couple of days ago two workers, A and B, were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
to participate in a study. They each earned 1 USD by participating, but were also able
to earn more during the study.
In the study, the two participants were asked to complete a task. After the task was
completed the participants were asked which of the two following payments schemes they
preferred:
• I: By a random draw it will be decided who of the two will receive 5 USD for the
task and who will receive 1 USD for the task.
• II: Both will be paid 2 USD for the task.
The participants were informed that their answers with a certain probability would be
drawn to determine the payment between them. Alternatively, it would be determined by
a third party. Both participants answered that they preferred I, but their answer was not
drawn to determine the payment - the payment will therefore be determined by a third
party.
You are this third party, and we now want you to choose how the two participants will
be paid. The participants will be paid according to what you decide within three weeks.
You can choose between:
• I-B: Participant A will be paid 1 USD for the task and participant B will be paid 5
USD for the task
• II: Both will be paid 2 USD for the task.
I choose: I-B or II (no other answers allowed)
Treatment 4 - Ex Ante (No information):
We will now ask you to make a choice that has consequences for a real situation. A
couple of days ago two workers, A and B, were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
to participate in a study. They were each paid 1 USD for participating, but were also
able to earn more during the study.
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In the study, the two participants were asked to complete a task. After the task was
completed the participants were told that the payment for the task was going to be
determined by a third party.
You are this third party, and we now want you to choose how the two participants will
be paid. The participants will be paid according to what you decide within three weeks.
You can choose between:
• I: By a random draw it will be decided who of the two will receive 5 USD for the
task and who will receive 1 USD for the task.
• II: Both will be paid 2 USD for the task.
I choose: I or II (no other answers allowed)
Treatment 5 - Ex Post Alternative A (No information):
We will now ask you to make a choice that has consequences for a real situation. A
couple of days ago two workers, A and B, were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
to participate in a study. They each earned 1 USD by participating, but were also able
to earn more during the study.
In the study, the two participants were asked to complete a task. After the task was com-
pleted the participants were told that the payment for the task with a certain probability
was going to be determined by a third party.
You are this third party, and we now want you to choose how the two participants will
be paid. The participants will be paid according to what you decide within three weeks.
You can choose between:
• I-A: Participant A will be paid 5 USD for the task and participant B will be paid 1
USD for the task
• II: Both will be paid 2 USD for the task.
I choose: I-A or II (no other answers allowed)
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Treatment 6 - Ex Post Alternative B (No information):
We will now ask you to make a choice that has consequences for a real situation. A
couple of days ago two workers, A and B, were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
to participate in a study. They each earned 1 USD by participating, but were also able
to earn more during the study.
In the study, the two participants were asked to complete a task. After the task was com-
pleted the participants were told that the payment for the task with a certain probability
was going to be determined by a third party.
You are this third party, and we now want you to choose how the two participants will
be paid. The participants will be paid according to what you decide within three weeks.
You can choose between:
• I-B: Participant A will be paid 1 USD for the task and participant B will be paid 5
USD for the task
• II: Both will be paid 2 USD for the task.
I choose: I-B or II (no other answers allowed)
8.2.2 Statements
Please consider to what extent you agree with the following statements (1 = completely
disagree - 10 = completely agree)
• The society should aim to equalize income (1 = completely disagree - 10 = com-
pletely agree)
• The society should aim to ensure individual freedom in economic choices (1 = com-
pletely disagree - 10 = completely agree)
8.2.3 Background questions
The spectators where asked about their age, gender, municipality, level of education,
household income and political affiliation.
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8.3 Argument for rejecting the principle of dominance
Below follows an argument from Nissan-Rozen (2017) for rejecting the principle of dom-
inance when having to choose between the ex ante Pareto, ex post egalitarianism, and
dominance principle.
Suppose there is a spectator choosing between prospect A and B that is an ex post
egalitarian, specifically involving that she prefers the distribution (1,1) for certain over
both of the unequal distributions (3,0) and (0,3), assuming that the spectator treats the
individuals symmetrically. Additionally, if a prospect gives a higher payoff to at least
one of the individuals, while leaving none of the individuals worse off, then the spectator
prefers this prospect. That is, the spectator prefers (1.5,5) to (1,5). Consider table 15
presented by Nissan-Rozen.




In this situation, prospect A will be preferred both if w1 occurs and if w2 occurs, and thus
the dominance principle yields that prospect A is preferred to prospect B. Consider now
the reasons for preferring prospect A to prospect B. First, if w1 is the state of the world
that occurs, A is preferred to B on egalitarian grounds even though it reduces individual
1’s payoff by 2 units. The reason for choosing A must be that it increases individual 2’s
payoff by 1 unit. Secondly, if w2 would be the state of the world, individual 2 is indifferent
between prospects A and B and hence, the reason for choosing A is that individual 1’s
payoff increases by 0.5 units. In sum, the spectator chooses prospect A for individual 2’s
best interest in the case of w1 and for individual 1’s best interest in the case of w2.
However, individual 1 would overall prefer that the spectator chooses prospect B, as his
expected payoff is higher. Therefore, individual 1 do not prefer that the spectator chooses
prospect A for his sake, as is the case with w2. Since individual 1 has only a 0.5 units
increase in payoff as a reason for preferring A, but a 2 units increase in payoff as a reason
for preferring B, he would overall prefer that the spectator ignores the 0.5 units increase
as an argument for choosing prospect A.
If the spectator follows this and does not take the aforementioned reason into account
when choosing between prospects A and B, then there are two conflicting reasons for
choosing A and B respectively. Choosing A yields a 1 unit increase for individual 2,
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while choosing B yields a 2 unit increase for individual 1, both with a probability of 50%.
Nissan-Rozen concludes that in this case the reason for choosing B overrides the reason
for choosing A. This is because the dominance principle is sensitive to all reasons and fails
to ignore reasons that the individuals would prefer were ignored. Therefore, he suggests
that the dominance principle should be rejected.
8.4 Heterogeneity
Table 16: Additional hypothesis test for Table 11
Gender Political Education
(B=1 if Female) (B=1 if Conservative) (B=1 if High)
lincom:
Difference(Ex post) -0.028 0.072 0.036
(0.051) (0.059) (0.051)
Difference(Norway) 0.019 0.107∗ 0.002
(0.054) (0.060) (0.059)
Note: The first row shows the result of a hypothesis test testing whether the sum of the coefficients
of the variables "Ex post x B" "Ex post x B x Norway" is equal to zero. The second row shows
the result of a hypothesis test testing whether the sum of the coefficients of the variables "B x
Norway" "Ex post x B x Norway" is equal to zero. The coefficients can be found in Table 11.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2: Share implementing inequality in different subgroups (information treatments)
62
8.5 Probit regressions
Table 17: Table 7 using a probit model
Norway Norway United States United States Pooled Pooled
Ex post 0.076∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.048 0.052∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020)
Norway 0.143∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020)
Female 0.110∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.030) (0.019)
High age 0.129∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.030) (0.019)
High education -0.039 -0.029 -0.034
(0.026) (0.037) (0.022)
Conservative -0.062∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.020)
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 2000 2000
Note: The table reports the results from six probit regressions of imple-
mented equality on different explanatory variables, including background variables.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 18: Table 8 using a probit model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ex post 0.046∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.053 0.052
(0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.037) (0.053)
Norway 0.102∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.0195) (0.028)
Norway x Ex post 0.038 0.037
(0.039) (0.040)
Female x Ex post -0.0014 -0.0032
(0.039) (0.039)
Conservative x Ex post -0.049 -0.045
(0.039) (0.039)
High age x Ex post -0.016 -0.0094
(0.040) (0.040)
High education x Ex post 0.014 0.020
(0.043) (0.044)
Control variables X X X X X X
Observations 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
lincom:
Ex post (B) 0.083∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.030 0.053∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.023)
Note: The table reports the results from six probit regressions of implemented equality on differ-
ent explanatory variables, including background variables. All background variables from Table 7
are included in the regression. The linear combination is the effect of being in the ex post treat-
ment for subgroup B, which is the subgroup interacted with "Ex post" in the relevant column.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 19: Table 9 using a probit model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ex post 0.072∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.055∗ 0.053 0.037
(0.025) (0.034) (0.030) (0.043) (0.051)
Female x Ex post -0.007 -0.003
(0.051) (0.051)
Conservative x Ex post 0.057 0.058
(0.056) (0.056)
High education x Ex post 0.028 0.029
(0.053) (0.053)
Control variables X X X X X
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
lincom:
Ex post (B) 0.068∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.047) (0.031)
Note: The table reports the results from six probit regressions of implemented
equality on different explanatory variables, including background variables. All
background variables from Table 7 are included in the regression. The lin-
ear combination is the effect of being in the ex post treatment for subgroup
B, which is the subgroup interacted with "Ex post" in the relevant column.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 20: Table 10 using a probit model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ex post 0.052∗ 0.048 0.098∗∗∗ 0.049 0.092
(0.030) (0.040) (0.036) (0.064) (0.076)
Female x Ex post 0.008 0.001
(0.060) (0.060)
Conservative x Ex post -0.125∗∗ -0.125∗∗
(0.055) (0.055)
High education x Ex post 0.004 0.008
(0.072) (0.073)
Control variables X X X X X
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
lincom:
Ex post (B) 0.056 -0.027 0.052∗
(0.044) (0.046) (0.034)
Note: The table reports the results from six probit regressions of implemented
equality on different explanatory variables, including background variables. All
background variables from Table 7 are included in the regression. The lin-
ear combination is the effect of being in the ex post treatment for subgroup
B, which is the subgroup interacted with "Ex post" in the relevant column.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 21: Table 11 using a probit model
Gender Political Education
(B=1 if Female) (B=1 if Conservative) (B=1 if High)
Ex post 0.042 0.087∗∗∗ 0.042
(0.035) (0.032) (0.057)
Ex post x Norway 0.045 -0.023 0.021
(0.053) (0.047) (0.075)
Ex post x B 0.007 -0.110∗∗ 0.005
(0.053) (0.049) (0.064)
Ex post x B x Norway -0.015 0.173∗∗ 0.027
(0.079) (0.080) (0.088)
B x Norway 0.068 -0.089∗ -0.040
(0.054) (0.053) (0.061)
Norway 0.070∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗
(0.037) (0.033) (0.052)
B 0.064∗ -0.012 -0.022
(0.037) (0.033) (0.045)
Control variables X X X
Observations 2000 2000 2000
lincom:
Ex post (US, B) 0.049 -0.023 0.047
(0.039) (0.041) (0.030)
Ex post (Norway, not B) 0.087∗∗ 0.064∗ 0.063
(0.039) (0.034) (0.049)
Ex post (Norway, B) 0.079∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.054) (0.036)
Norway (Ex ante, B) 0.138∗∗∗ 0.048 0.089∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.044) (0.032)
Norway (Ex post, not B) 0.115∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.034) (0.054)
Norway (Ex post, B) 0.168∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.051) (0.033)
Note: The table reports the results from three probit regressions on different explanatory vari-
ables, including background variables, and interaction terms with the subgroups specified in
equation (4). B is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the spectator is female (column 1), is
conservative (column 2), or has high education (column 3). All background variables from
Table 7 are also included in the regression, except the background variable captured in B.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Table 14 using a probit model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ex post 0.0651∗∗∗ 0.0810∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0818∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0189) (0.0124) (0.0191)
Norway 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0195) (0.0196)
Information -0.129∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.0992∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0168) (0.0162) (0.0201)
Ex post x Information -0.0278 -0.0290
(0.0252) (0.0253)
Norway x Information -0.0382 -0.0391
(0.0256) (0.0256)
Control variables X X X X
Observations 4005 4005 4005 4005
Note: The table reports the results from four probit regressions of implemented
equality on different explanatory variables, including background variables. All
background variables from Table 7 are included in the regression. The lin-
ear combination is the effect of being in the ex post treatment for subgroup
B, which is the subgroup interacted with "Ex post" in the relevant column.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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